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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Risk Assessment in the Nuclear Industry 
The safe operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) requires a careful analysis of the 
consequences of all events that can lead to the release of radionuclides to the environment. 
The initiating events can range from the failure of key safety systems which may not be 
immediately detectable to breaks in the primary coolant pipes which can cause damage to 
the fuel rods within a short period after the accident. Safety analysis, performed both 
before the construction of the NPPs and during the operation whenever there is a change 
in the configuration of the plants, can give a quantitative estimate of the risk that 
accidents or unforeseen events that occur in the plant will lead to offsite consequences.  
 Risk is estimated as a combination of the frequency of the initiating event (for 
instance, an accident) and the consequence of that event. Risk analysis attempts to 
determine how the initiating event will progress in time, incorporating the information on 
the responses of plant personnel and plant equipment. Risk analysis is especially crucial 
in the nuclear industry since failures of the safety barriers in an NPP may lead to a large 
release of radiation to the general public. Even if the plant were shut down immediately 
after an accident, the decay heat generated in the core will still require the operation of 
the cooling system at an adequate capacity. This level of dependence on the proper 
function of plant equipment long after shutdown means that there are many possible 
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evolution paths that an initiating event may follow with time. Risk analysis would 
therefore require a careful prediction of these evolution paths that may result in the 
undesirable consequences. 
 One of the earliest comprehensive probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) studies of 
nuclear power plants is WASH-1400 [NRC75]. This study focused on two representative 
power plants: Surry Power Station Unit 1 (a pressurized water reactor), and Peach 
Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 (a boiling water reactor). The methodology 
employed in the study involves combining the fault tree and event tree structures. Fault 
trees are used to determine the combination of equipment faults that will lead to the 
failure of plant systems while the event trees are used to determine how different paths in 
accident evolution can lead to releases of radioactivity. Both the accident sequence and 
amount and mode of radioactivity releases are grouped into categories to make the 
analysis manageable. The WASH-1400 is also notable in its use of probabilistic density 
functions (PDFs) to account for uncertainties of event probabilities [Lee11]. The Zion 
and Indian Point probabilistic safety assessment studies [Hay99] were conducted around 
1982. These studies used the impact vector methodology to simplify the PRA analysis 
and focused on evaluating the safety of these two plants considering their location near 
the urban centers. 
 The next major NRC-sponsored PRA study of nuclear power plants occurred a 
little over a decade after WASH 1400 and is commonly referred to as NUREG-1150 
[NRC90b]. This study looks at three additional NPPs in addition to the two studied in 
WASH-1400. NUREG-1150 examines the accidents starting from any event that can lead 
to plant damage and follows the evolution until the release of radionuclides to the public 
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and evaluates the consequences of such a release in terms of fatalities.  The accident 
progression event tree (APET) is constructed based on both expert solicitation and 
simulation codes (which in turn are validated through experiments and operation logs). 
Accident progression analysis generates a large number of possible accident pathways 
and is simplified by grouping of the sequence into bins based on the similarity of 
containment failure mode, probability, and time [Hak08]. The consequence analysis 
includes the use of radionuclide transport model to predict the spread of radioactivity 
after containment failure.  The final risk integration gives the overall risk of the NPP to 
the public and is based on both the probability of the accident or malfunction and the 
consequences associated with them [Lee11]. 
 
1.2  Limitation of Static Risk Analysis 
One of the limitations of PRA conducted using the static fault tree (FT) and event tree 
(ET) is that the dynamic response of the plant over time from an initial perturbation is not 
explicitly represented [Buc08]. The plant dynamics, arising from the interaction of 
different plant components and from the interaction between the operator and the plant 
control equipment, cannot be easily predicted during the construction of the static PRA 
models. The FT/ET approach usually assumes that the accident scenario can be 
represented as a static grouping of equipment failures or operator failures [Ald92]. 
Although during the construction of the ET, plant simulations are used to determine the 
different accident progression paths that the plant may take, it cannot easily account for 
how parameters such as the time delays in the actuation of safety systems will affect the 
accident progression. Furthermore, the actions of the automatic control systems depend 
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on both the time-dependent plant parameters and the corrective actions performed by the 
operator, whose state of knowledge depends on the path of the accident evolution [Kun08, 
Lab05]. These dependencies make it difficult to predict ahead of time the most likely set 
of paths in which the accident will evolve. 
 All the possible dependencies of the accident progression mentioned above means 
that an ideal risk analysis model should account for: 
(1) the current status of all the relevant plant components, 
(2) the current status of the plant variables (e.g., pressure and temperature), 
(3) the current state of knowledge of the operator ,  
(4) the evolution history during the transient of the plant variables, and 
(5) the response model of both the automatic control systems and the operators. 
The conventional FT/ET approach can account for the plant component status, the 
anticipated response of the control systems, and to some extent, the anticipated change in 
the system variables. However, it ignores how observations made by the operators during 
the transient can impact the action of the operators. Also, since the response of the plant 
variables is assumed during the construction of the model, it is based on the most likely 
plant configuration and configuration changes that the modeler thinks will occur during 
the accident. Any deviation from these assumptions can lead to changes in the plant 
response that can render the model invalid [Kop05].  
 The  limitations mentioned above were recognized  as far back as in the 1980s, 
when the concept of dynamic PRA was first developed in detail [Aco92]. However, many 
of the dynamic PRA techniques that have been proposed have found limited applications 
in the risk analysis of large, complex systems. For any system, the evolution of the 
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accident can take many different paths, each leading to different undesirable 
consequences (e.g., core damage) at different times. For large systems, this leads to 
situations where the complexity of the model grows exponentially with time. Today, 
detailed dynamic PRA studies are usually done for a smaller subsystems in situations 
where either the interactions between the process variable and the control systems are 
critically important, or in cases where human behavior needs to be explicitly modeled.   
 Over the past few years, there have been recognitions that even though static PRA 
may be insufficient for certain instances where the interaction between plant processes 
and control systems is important, we often do not need the full power of dynamic PRA 
methodologies and their associated complications. Several authors have proposed the use 
of analysis techniques borrowed from the study of artificial intelligence such as the Petri 
net, artificial neural network, and Bayesian networks to bridge the gap between static and 
dynamic PRA [Mur02, Por10, Shi08]. Due to their ease of construction and use, 
graphical methods such as the Bayesian network are especially attractive, especially 
compared to dynamic PRA methodologies such as the continuous event tree where the 
construction of the model can be difficult and time consuming. In this dissertation, we 
will show an extension on the use of the Bayesian network in risk analysis to include the 
incorporation of the reactor transient code surrogate that can model the dynamics of the 
reactor during accidents. This linking of the Bayesian network to a fast-running code 
surrogate will allow risk analysis to be performed in such a way that plant dynamics are 
directly incorporated into the model. The technique can serve as a bridge between 
conventional static PRA techniques and a full blown dynamic PRA model. 
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1.3  Research Scope 
The research presented in this dissertation will focus on developing an appropriate code 
surrogate that can accurately represent the behavior of the reactor during a loss-of-
feedwater (LOFW) transient and linking it to the dynamic Bayesian network model 
representing the system. Using such a combination will allow the risk analysis to be 
performed in such a way as to directly account for the dynamics of the plant while 
maintaining the simplicity (as least for model construction) of static PRA. As mentioned 
in the previous section, although there exist various dynamic PRA methodologies that do 
explicitly use system dynamics in the risk analysis, the models using these techniques are 
either too difficult to construct for large systems or will take too long to solve using 
today’s computing capabilities. The work presented here is not meant to replace either the 
static or dynamic PRA. Rather, it is one additional tool that will be available to risk 
analysts should situations arise where the application of this method will help reduce the 
burden of the analysis of the safety of dynamic systems. 
 The dissertation will introduce the use of Bayesian network in dynamic PRA over 
several chapters. Chapter 2 will cover the currently existing methods for dynamic PRA 
and a simple problem that is commonly used to benchmark new dynamic PRA 
methodology. It will also describe some previous uses of the Bayesian network in risk 
analysis. Chapter 3 will describe the theory of the Bayesian network and its extension to 
the time domain in the form of dynamic Bayesian network (DBN). It will also revisit the 
simple problem introduced in chapter 2 and shows how this problem can be modeled with 
the BN. Chapter 4 will introduce the alternating conditional expectation (ACE) technique, 
a nonparametric regression technique that we will use to develop simplified models (i.e., 
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the code surrogate) to represent system dynamics during an accident. Chapters 5 and 6 
describe the LOFW transient in the pressurized water reactor and a RELAP5 model that 
is used to study the behavior of the plant during this accident. Chapter 7 presents the 
results of the risk analysis during the LOFW transient performed with a DBN. The 
dissertation concludes with chapter 8 with a discussion and ideas for possible extension 
of the DBN model to include applications in both diagnostics and real time monitoring 
and updating of data. 
CHAPTER 2 
Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
 
2.1 Survey of Available Techniques 
Dynamic PRA methodologies that are available today are divided into three broad classes: 
dynamic event tree, discrete event transition models, and Monte Carlo simulation. The 
concept of the dynamic event tree extends the static event tree by allowing for branching 
at arbitrary times during the transient. The branching can be based on both the 
deterministic changes of the plant process variables and the stochastic transitions (failures) 
of plant components. The discrete event transition models are based on the discretized 
state of the plant. The plant state is defined by plant parameters (since these parameters 
are usually continuous, discretization is required) and the state of the components. 
Generally, the transition rate between plant states are dependent on the paths that the 
plant takes to reach the current state. However, keeping track of such a history would 
require an enormous amount of memory and may be impractical. Therefore, a Markov 
assumption is usually used. Under this assumption, the probability of transition to another 
system state is taken to be only dependent on the current state and is independent of how 
the system reaches the current state.  
The Monte Carlo simulation represents the plant evolution based on component 
state transition probabilities. Although the simulation technique can be used to analyze a 
large variety of dynamic problems with very little assumptions, the main drawback is that 
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a proper sampling technique is required so that rare events (which cover the 
majority of the accident scenarios in the NPP) are adequately sampled.  
 
2.1.1 Dynamic Event Tree 
The dynamic event tree (DET) technique traces the plant state as it evolves in time after 
an initiating event [Hak08]. Within a certain time interval, the plant state may change 
from either the stochastic change of the component state (for instance, from an equipment 
failure) or from the deterministic change of the system variable as governed by plant 
physics. These deterministic changes can be obtained either from a suitable plant 
simulation code or from sets of equations governing the physical parameters. For cases 
where the plant behavior follows the Markov assumption (no dependence on evolution 
history), the dynamic event tree technique requires little computer memory. However, for 
cases where the history dependence is important (for instance, cases where observations 
of the operators play a role in future behavior [Hol99]), storing all the pathways of the 
accident evolution can be memory intensive.  The dynamic event tree technique is also 
not suitable for sensitivity analysis since any change in the rule set or failure probability 
will require reanalyzing the entire scenario. 
 The DET methodology has been applied to many problems. Acosta looks at the 
application in the analysis of the steam generator tube rupture accident [Aco93].  
Amendola and Reina applied the idea to the DYLAM code [Coj93] which allows the 
analysis of small subsystems of the NPP [Ald92]. Labeau [Lab050] extends the idea of 
the DET to include cases where the branching can be induced by the occurrence of 
certain stimuli which can be specified during the model construction. 
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 2.1.2 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Direct simulation of the plant behavior involves sampling the possible branching of the 
plant state based on a specified probability distribution. Unlike the case of the dynamic 
event tree approach which determines the branching based on a pre-specified set of 
branching rules, the Monte Carlo simulation samples from a large number of possible 
branches. This method of sampling leads to one major disadvantage for the Monte Carlo 
simulation: the difficulty of adequately representing rare events. Appropriate biasing is 
required to ensure that the result represents all the paths that can lead to core damage 
during the time interval of interest. Another disadvantage of the Monte Carlo method is 
that since the final result is an overall probability of reaching a particular end state, it is 
difficult to gather information about any particular progression pathway. Like the 
dynamic event tree approach, perturbation of the failure probability usually requires 
running a completely new simulation. 
 The Monte Carlo simulation technique applied to the water tank demonstration 
problem is often used in benchmarking other PRA techniques [Mar96].  This problem 
will be discussed in more detail in section 2.2 and will be used as a benchmarking case 
for the DBN technique in chapter 3. 
 
2.1.3 Discrete Transition Models 
The discrete transition model discretizes the system state and component state into 
different bins [Bel06]. The system evolution itself is represented by the transition of this 
combined state between different bins. Under the Markov assumption, the transition rate 
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depends only on the current state, and possibly on the transient time, but not on the detail 
of how the plant reaches its current state.  
 Risk analysis using Markov chains for static systems defines the system state as 
the state in which the system (i.e., all the components) resides. However, for dynamic 
systems, we usually make a distinction between the component state and system state.  
Let 1 2( , ,..., )
T
Nx x x x= be the vector describing the state of the system variables kx ,
.  These system variables are plant parameters such as pressure, 
temperature, and water level that evolve deterministically with time, given a certain plant 
configuration. The time evolution of the system variables is described by 
{1,2,..., }k N∈
  
 ( ),i
dx f x
dt
=   (2.1) 
where ( )if x is the function describing how the system vector x will evolve with time, 
given the component state i.  Here, the component state refers to a vector describing the 
state of the plant equipment such as valve position, pump speed, or control rod position.  
At any given time t, the NPP can be described by the pair ( ),t tx i . Our goal is to find the 
conditional probability density 0 0 0( , , | , , )x i t x i tπ , where 0 0 0( , , )x i t is the initial state of the 
plant. If we now assume that the system is Markovian, Eq. (2.1) will satisfy the 
differential Chapman-Kolmogorov equation: 
 
( )0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
,
( , , | , , ) ( ) ( , , | , , ) ( ) ( , , | , , )
                               ( | ) ( , , | , , ) 0.
x i i
j j i
x i t x i t f x x i t x i t x x i t x i t
t
p j i x x i t x i t
π π λ π
π
≠
∂ +∇ +∂
− → =∑
i
 (2.2) 
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Note that the probability ( | )p j i x→  that the component state vector will change from 
state j to state i depends on the system state x. An example of this dependence is when the 
failure probability of a valve depends on the coolant temperature. The transition 
probability ( )i xλ is the probability that the component state leaves state i, given the 
system state x: 
 
,
( ) ( | ).i
j j i
x p i j xλ
≠
= →∑  (2.3) 
We should note that in the case where the component failure probability is independent of 
the system state, we can integrate Eq. (2.2) over all system state 0x . Defining the 
component transition probability integrated over system states 
 ( , ) ( , , ) ,i t x i t dxπ π= ∫  (2.4) 
Eq. (2.2) becomes 
 
,
( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ).i
j j i
d i t i t p j i j t
dt
π λ π π
≠
= − + →∑  (2.5) 
Equation (2.5) is the Markov equation commonly used for reliability analysis problems 
with failure rates that are independent of the deterministic system state [Dev92]. 
Suppose Eq. (2.1) has the solution 0( ) ( , ).ix t g t x=  Equation (2.2) can be 
converted to an integral equation [Dev92, Lab05]: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
0
0, , , , , 1 ,
|1 , , , , ,
( )
i i
t
j i
i jt
x i t u i t x g t u F t u du
p j i u
u u j t x g u dF u du
x u
π π δ
λ π τ δ τ τλ λ
= − −
→+ − −
∫
∫ ∫ i
.
 (2.6) 
where 
 ( ) ( )0 ,, 1
t
i
t
g s u ds
iF t u e
λ−∫= −  (2.7) 
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The integral equation (2.6) can be solved using Monte Carlo methods [Ald92]. 
 To avoid the need for working with continuous state space, we can discretize Eq. 
(6). We start by defining the cell-averaged probability as: 
  (2.8) ( , ) ( , , ) ,
k
k
D
i t x i t dxπ π= ∫
where kD is the partition of the state variable x: k
k
x D∈∪ . Defining the indicator 
function 
  (2.9) 
1,  x D
( )
0,  otherwise
k
kH x
∈⎧= ⎨⎩
we can integrate Eq. (6) over the cell  kD and obtain 
  
 (2.10) 
( )
( )
0
0 0
0
,
( , ) ( , , ) ( , ) exp ( , )
           ( , , ) ( , ) ( | ) exp ( , ) .
t
k k i i i
t
t t
k i i i
j j i t t
i t u i t H g t u g s u ds
du d u j t H g t u p j i u g s u ds
π π λ
τπ τ λ
≠
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ − → −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫ ∫
∑ ∫ ∫ ∫
It is possible to replace the transition probability ( | )p j i u→ by ( )| lp j i u→ < > , where 
 is the average value of the system state over the cell lu< > lD . Furthermore, we can 
replace the indicator function kH by its cell average. These approximations lead to an 
averaged form of Eq. (2.10) which forms the basis of the cell-to-cell mapping technique 
[Wan04]. 
The Monte Carlo method and the dynamic event tree approach to solving dynamic 
PRA problems are not exclusive of one another. A combination of these two methods 
called the MCDET (Monte Carlo Dynamic Event Tree) was proposed by Hofer and 
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described in [Hof10]. In MCDET, the continuous event tree is discretized by means of 
Monte Carlo simulations. Discretization here refers to the sampling of the transition time 
and output state from the continuous event tree. The simulation yields groupings of the 
sampled paths which can then be analyzed. 
Recently, interest in the use of graphical techniques in dynamic PRA analysis has 
led to a new class of techniques [And09]. Dynamic reliability analysis methods that are 
based on an extension of the static method includes the dynamic fault tree (DFT). A DFT 
is essentially a conventional static fault tree with several new dynamic gates added 
[Shi08]. The new gates include the functional dependency (FDEP) gate, the warm and 
cold spare gates, the priority AND (PAND) gate, and the sequence enforcing (SEQ) gate. 
The FDEP gate sets the output to true if the trigger is true. The warm and cold spare gates 
are used for components that are in standby. The PAND gate is true only if the basic 
event is true in a predetermined order. An extension of the PAND gate to more than two 
basic events is the SEQ gate. Each of the gates in the DFT can be converted to an 
equivalent Markov model and solved via the standard methods such as the matrix 
equation and Monte Carlo simulations [Pou08]. 
 
2.2  The Water Tank Problem 
The water tank problem and its variation are often used to benchmark new dynamic PRA 
methodologies [Mar96]. The problem is based on a water tank with a prescribed inlet and 
outlet flows. The controller controls both flows based on the current water level of the 
tank. 
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 Figure 2.1. Water tank problem. Picture adapted from [Puc08]. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the basic set up of the problem. We start from an initial value where the 
liquid level is at 0 m. Each of the three control units can be in one of four states shown in 
Table 1.1. We assume for simplicity that there is no repair and so if the controller fails 
either to state 3 or state 4, it will remain in that state forever (i.e., states 3 and 4 are 
absorbing states). Each of the three controllers will adjust its state (between state 1 and 2) 
based on the water level in the tank, with the goal of maintaining the water level between 
the lower set point lsp and the high set point hsp. This control behavior is summarized in 
Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.1. State space for each controller. 
Controller State Identifier Controller State Description 
1 OFF 
2 ON 
3 Failed OFF 
4 Failed ON 
 
Table 2.2. Response of the controller to water level. 
Water Level h Controller 1 Controller 2 Controller 3 
lsp < h < hsp 1 1 1 
h < lsp 2 2 1 
h > hsp 1 1 2 
 
We will assume that the probability of failure into either states 3 or 4 is independent of 
the original state. The failure time is assumed to be exponentially distributed with the 
time constants of 219 hr, 175 hr, and 320 hr for controllers 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The 
pump connected to each of the controllers has the capacity to change the water level by 
0.6 m/hr. For this problem, the differential equation governing the water level has a 
simple analytic solution: 
 1 2 3( ) ( ) ( )( ),jh t h t Q a a a t t j= + + − −  (2.11) 
where 
  (2.12) 
1, if  is in state 1 or 3
0,if  is in state 2 or 4,i
i
a
i
⎧= ⎨⎩
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tand is the previous time step. The mission time is 1000 hr. The goal of the problem 
is to find the time dependent probability that the tank will be in either the dryout (
jt <
h L< ) 
or overflow ( ) state. h H>
 In the problem described above, the failure rate is independent of the system 
variable (the water level). This means that classical static PRA methods such as ET/FT 
and Markov chain can be easily used to solve the problem. However, complications will 
arise if we allow for cases where the component failure rate depends on the component 
state or the process variable. In these latter two cases, using static PRA to analyze the 
problem will present more difficulty. Marseguerra [Mar96] discusses several variations to 
the water tank problem and how the Monte Carlo approach to dynamic PRA can be used 
to evaluate the probabilities of overflow and dryout. In chapter 3, we will solve the basic 
water tank problem with the dynamic Bayesian network.  
CHAPTER 3 
THE BAYESIAN NETWORK 
 
The Bayesian network (BN) is used in many diverse areas of application ranging from 
medical diagnosis to speech recognition. In this chapter, we will describe the basics of a 
BN, how they are constructed, and how they can be solved. The theory that is available to 
support the analysis of the BN is very broad and most will not be needed for a successful 
application of the BN to certain specific problems.  Nevertheless, we will briefly touch on 
the major developments and applications of the BN so that the versatility of this model 
can be appreciated.  
 The application of BN to reliability analysis is a relatively recent development. 
The static form of the network has been applied to study the risk associated with nuclear 
waste disposal [Lee06] and to study the impact of equipment maintenance on reliability 
[Web10]. Montani and Portinale [Mon08] developed a reliability tool called RADYBAN 
which uses the BN to solve dynamic fault tree problems. Boudali [Bou05] looks at the 
formulation of the continuous form of a temporal BN to calculate the time to failure of an 
equipment network. In this sense, the BN can be applied to problems that are traditionally 
analyzed using static fault trees. In their review paper, Langseth [Lan05] discusses how 
the BN can be used to incorporate the quality of opinions of different experts directly into 
a risk model.  
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A key feature of the BN that is appealing to many analysts is that the network 
itself can be constructed based on intuition that is developed through experience without 
the need for detailed knowledge of the analysis techniques. Although this feature is 
shared by other graphical techniques, BN is perhaps the most developed in terms of the 
underlying theoretical framework. In contrast, powerful techniques such as the Markov or 
semi-Markov models can give similar (sometimes more detailed) results compared to the 
BN, but with a greater effort required for their construction and analysis. 
 We will divide the presentation of BN theory into several sections. Section 3.1 
discusses the basics of the static BN including the interpretation of the independency 
statement and the use of conditional probability function to quantify the network. Section 
3.2 extends the static BN to include a time domain. There are several different ways of 
including time into the BN, each with their own advantages and disadvantages. 
Methodologies available to solve the BN is discussed in Section 3.3. Today, there are a 
number of commercial and open source software available for BN analysis. The most 
suitable method used to solve the network can depend on the size of the network, the type 
and amount of data available to populate the network, and the type of information we 
wish to obtain from the network. In Section 3.4, we will present an application of the BN 
to solving a dynamic fault tree problem using a continuous formulation of the network. 
Finally, we will end the chapter by applying the BN to analyze the water tank problem 
that we presented in Chapter 2.  
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3.1 Static Bayesian Network 
A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph with nodes representing random variables, 
and directed arcs linking the nodes, representing conditional dependencies between 
different variables.  It is convenient to classify the nodes as either a parent node or a child 
node. The parent node is a node that has one or more arc originating from it and pointing 
towards another node. A child node is a node with incoming arc from another node.  A 
node with no parent is referred to as the root node and a node with no children is the leaf 
node. For instance, in Figure 3.1, nodes A and B are the parents of node D (this implies D 
is the child node for nodes A and B). Nodes A and B are root nodes while nodes C and E 
are leaf nodes.  
Each parent node N in a BN is associated with the marginal probability 
distribution P(N) and each child node M has an associated conditional probability 
P(M|pa(M)), where pa(M) is a set of all the parents of M. Referring again to the BN in 
Figure 3.1, a complete description of the BN would include, in addition to the graph in 
Figure 3.1, specification of the probabilities P(A),P(B), P(C), P(C|A), P(D|A,B), and 
P(E|D). 
 
Figure 3.1. A representative Bayesian network. 
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 A graphical representation of the BN like the one in Figure 3.1 shows the 
conditional independence among the random variables. Generally, a node in a BN is 
conditionally independent of its non-descendants given the parent nodes. (A node F1 is a 
descendant of node F2 if there is a directed path from F2 to F1.) In Figure 3.1, the node E 
is conditionally independent of nodes A and B given that the state of node D is known: 
 ( | , , ) ( | ).P E A B D P E D=  (3.1) 
             
Conditional independence statements like the one in Eq. (3.1) can be used to simplify the 
joint probability of a system. For any random variables X1, X2,..,Xn we can factorize the 
joint probability, without any assumption, using the chain rule as: 
  (3.2)                        1 2 1 1
1
( , ,..., ) ( | ,..., ).
n
n i
i
P X X X P X X X −
=
=∏ i
)i
However, if we exploit the property of the BN that a variable is independent of its non-
descendants given the parents, then Eq. (3.2) reduces to: 
  (3.3)               ( ) (( )1 2
1
, ,..., | .
n
n i
i
P X X X P X pa X
=
=∏
The key property of the BN technique is that it factorizes the joint probability 
distribution. If we have a set of N random variables , all the information that 
we can ever know about these variables can be obtained by knowing the joint distribution 
function of the variables. However, specifying the joint distribution function is a 
complicated task. For a discrete random variable, suppose we assume that each of the 
in the set above can be in any one of m possible states. This means that to completely 
specify the joint distribution, we need to provide 
1{ ,.., }NX X
1N
iX
m −  numbers. There are several 
problems associated with this.  The most obvious problem is that it will be hard to use 
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this information, especially if m and N are both large. Even with today’s computer, the 
processing and storage of this amount of information will be slow and expensive. 
Oftentimes, we do not need all the information that is contained in the joint distribution. 
However, it is difficult to select the information that we do need without at least some 
preliminary analysis of the full distribution.  
The second problem is the difficulty of obtaining the information needed to 
specify the 1Nm − probabilities. Information from expert elicitation usually does not 
come in the form of probabilities, and even if they do, most likely not in the form that can 
be directly entered into the joint distribution. An alternative is to automatically update the 
probabilities with data. However, it will take a lot of data, which may not be 
available, to update the probabilities enough times that the resulting joint distribution 
accurately represents the true distribution. 
1Nm −
 A BN allows the joint probability distribution to be factored by exploiting the 
conditional independence relations among the different variables.  For instance, consider 
the BN shown in Figure 3.1. For simplicity, we will assume that each of the 5 nodes in 
the network can be in one of two states: TRUE or FALSE. If we were to specify the joint 
conditional distribution ( , , , ,P A i B j C k D l E m)= = = = = , we would need to specify 
25-1=31 probabilities. However, using the conditional independence assumption of 
Figure 3.1, we can write: 
 ( , , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | , ) ( | ).P A B C D E P A P B P C A P D A B P E D=  (3.4) 
 
The number of probabilities needed to specify  is one: we need to only specify 
. For the term , we only need to specify two 
( )P A
P C( TRUE) 1 ( FALSE)P A P A= = − = ( | )A
22 
 
probabilities:  and ( TRUE | FALSEP C A= = ) )( TRUE | TRUEP C A= =
)k n
. Using a 
similar reasoning for the other terms, we see that the total number of probabilities that we 
need to specify to determine the RHS of Eq. (3.4) is 1+1+2+4+2=10.  Therefore, we see 
that the assumption of conditional independence can be used to simplify the network. 
More generally, for a BN with n nodes with k parents or less, the complete specification 
of the joint distribution requires an order of (2 numbers. The unfactorized form of the 
joint probability requires an order of numbers. 2n
 
3.2 Dynamic Bayesian Network 
A dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) is a BN that incorporates nodes that can change 
with time. The simplest way to account for the time dependence is to divide the time line 
into different time “slices” and assign one complete static BN to each slice. The time 
dependence then is represented by an arc from the lower numbered slice to a higher 
numbered one. If the nodes for slice at time t is dependent only on nodes from slice t-1, 
then we say that the  DBN is a two-slice DBN. For a general case, the dependencies may 
extend to any time slice in the past. 
 
Figure 3.2 A simple dynamic BN expanded over two time slices. 
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A simple DBN is shown in Figure 3.2. For any given slice, node C is completely 
determined by its parents (nodes A and B). The parent node B at any given slice depends 
on the value of node A at the preceding slice. The arc linking A at slice 0 to B at slice 1 is 
referred to as an interslice arc. Interslice arcs indicate the dependence of the nodes that 
are time dependent.  
 The methods that are available to solve a static BN can be applied to dynamic 
DBN. The interslice arcs are treated as any regular arcs. Nodes representing the same 
variables but located in a different time slice are considered to be distinct for the 
algorithm.  
 The description of the DBN above applies for what is called an instant-based 
approach to temporal analysis. Another approach of introducing time into the BN is 
called the interval-based approach. In this approach, the random variables themselves 
represent events that are time dependent. The time line is usually divided into different 
disjoint intervals with the node (representing the random variable) defined according to 
the intervals in which it is located. The DBN models used for our work are all instant-
based. 
 
3.3 Continuous Bayesian Network 
So far, we have limited our discussion to BNs with nodes that represent discrete random 
variables. Generally, a BN has no limitation on the type of node it can have. A BN that 
contains both discrete nodes and continuous nodes are known as mixed or hybrid BN. 
Most of the inference algorithms that have been developed over the last few decades only 
apply to a discrete BN or to continuous BN with certain specific distributions. 
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Nevertheless, a continuous BN has several advantages over its counterpart. First, there is 
no need to discretize the sample space of the variables. This means that common 
problems that are associated with discrete BNs such as the state space explosion do not 
exist with the continuous version. Second, since many applications of the BN involve the 
use of continuous variables, the continuous form of the network is the natural choice to 
represent these variables. In these instances, the only real reason to discretize the 
variables is to have access to a greater selection of inference algorithms that can be used. 
Finally, the solution of continuous BNs can be expressed as integral equations which may 
be solved by various standard techniques. The ability to write an analytic solution to a 
BN problem may provide insights into the solution which are more difficult to obtain if 
we limit to only the numerical relations. 
 In this section, we will present a simple illustration on the use of the continuous 
BN. The problem is to use the continuous BN formalism to analyze the AND gate in a 
fault tree. The solution technique is based on the work by Boudali [Bou05] in which he 
presents the conversion of different dynamic fault tree gates to the BN equivalent.  The 
simple BN model representing an AND gate is shown in Figure 3.3 below. 
 
Figure 3.3. The BN representation of an AND gate. 
 
The variables A and B represents to components, each of which can be in either the 
operational (FALSE) or failed (TRUE) state. The node C is TRUE only if A and B are 
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both TRUE, otherwise it is FALSE. Let nodes A and B have the time-to-failure 
distributions ( )A Af t and ( )B Bf t , respectively. The function ( )A Af t  is the probability 
density function for component A to fail in the neighborhood of time At . A similar 
interpretation applies to ( )B Bf t . Next, we need to find the conditional time-to-failure 
distribution for the node C, given the states of nodes A and B. We note that if node A 
enters a failed state before node B, then the time to failure of the node C will be equal to 
the time-to-failure of node B. Conversely, if node B enters the failed state before node A, 
then the time to failure of node C will be the time to failure of node A. These two 
statements suggest that the conditional time-to-failure distribution for the node C will be: 
 | , ( | , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),C A B C A B B A C B A B C Af t t t u t t t t u t t t tδ δ= − − + − −  (3.5) 
where u(x) and ( )xδ are the unit step function and the Dirac delta function, respectively. 
The first term on the RHS is nonzero only when A fails before B while the second term is 
only nonzero when A fails after B. The delta function selects the failure time for C based 
on the component that fails last. If we now assume that components A and B are 
independent, we can form the joint time-to-failure density function as: 
 | ,( , , ) ( | , ) ( ) ( ).ABC C A B A Bf a b c f c a b f a f b=  (3.6) 
 Armed with the joint distribution shown in Eq. (3.5), we can calculate the density 
function for gate C. This can be done by marginalizing (integrating) Eq. (3.5) with 
respect to both a and b: 
 
[ ]
| ,0 0
( ) ( | , ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ,
C C A B A B
A A B B
A B
f c f c a b f a f b dadb
f c F c f c F c
d F c F c
dc
∞ ∞=
= +
=
∫ ∫
 (3.7) 
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where and are the cumulative time-to-failure distribution for components A 
and B, respectively.  Let us compare this solution to the result from the Markov chain 
analysis. To do this, we will first need to assume that the time-to-failure for both 
components A and B are exponentially distributed: 
( )AF x ( )BF x
  (3.8) ( ) 1 ,AaAF a e
λ−= −
  (3.9) ( ) 1 ,BbBF b e
λ−= −
where iλ is the failure rate of component i. Substituting Eqs. (3.8) and (3.9) into Eq.(3.7), 
we obtain the cumulative time-to-failure distribution of the AND gate: 
  (3.10) ( )( ) 1 .A B A Bt tCF t e e e
λ λ λ λ− − − += − − + t
We note that Eq. (3.10) agrees with what we would expect if we approach the problem 
directly using a Markov chain approach. 
 A similar approach can be used to derive the time-to-failure distribution for other 
gate types of both the static and dynamic fault trees. For cases involving more than two 
states, the manipulation of the associated equations becomes much more complicated. 
For large real world problems, the continuous BNs are usually either discretized and 
converted to the static BN or solved via Monte Carlo simulations. 
  
3.4 Application of Bayesian Network to the Water Tank Problem 
We now consider the water tank problem described in Chapter 2. The objective of this 
exercise is to calculate the probability of overflow and dryout as a function of time. 
Figure 3.2 shows the BN associated with this problem. The dependence of the variables 
vary over two time slices. The states of the three control units determine the changes in 
water level as governed by Eq. (2.11). The water level in the tank at any time step is the 
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level in the previous step plus any changes based on the configuration of the control units. 
In the network, this relation is presented by one interslice arc from each of the control 
unit in the previous slice and another interslice arc from the water level in the previous 
time step. Since the control units themselves have a constant failure probability, the state 
of these units at any one time slice depends on the state at the previous slice. The 
probabilities associated with these interslice arcs are the stochastic failure probabilities of 
the control units over the time interval represented by the slice. In addition to the 
possibility of failure, the control units also respond to the water level. These response are 
represented by the arcs from the water level node to the control units node. However, 
unlike the arcs representing the control failure, the control arcs are deterministic. 
 
Figure 3.4. A DBN representing the control functions of the water tank problem. 
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 The network in Figure 3.4 can be solved by starting at time 0 and solve the BN 
problem at time 0 with a prescribed initial condition. The result of this analysis will give 
the values to be used in the calculation of the network in the second slice. This process is 
repeated over all the time slices. The probability density for the water level in slice 1 can 
be written as: 
 , 1, 2, 3
( #) ( # | , 1, 2, 3) ( )
                 x ( 1) ( 2) ( 3),
W CU CU CU
P W P W W CU CU CU P W
P CU P CU P CU
= ∑
 (3.11) 
where the “#” symbol denotes the value in slice 1. At each time slice, the conditional 
probability function for the control unit i can be expressed in terms of the corresponding 
probability of the previous time slice: 
 
,
( #) ( # | , ) (
CUi W
P CUi P CUi CUi W P W= ).∑  (3.12) 
 The joint probability density can be summed over all the ancestor nodes: 
 , 1, 2, 3
( #) ( # | , 1, 2, 3) ( )
                              x ( 1) ( 2) ( 3),
W CU CU CU
P W P W W CU CU CU P W
P CU P CU P CU
= ∑
 (3.13) 
The conditional probability function  that appears in Equation (3.13) 
is specified by the behavior of the control units as shown in Table 2.2.  For instance, the 
control probability for control unit 1 is shown in Table 3.1. Here, we are assuming that 
each time slice represents a time step of 
( # | , #P CUi CUi W )
Δ . The transition probabilities include both the 
effect of stochastic failures and deterministic controls. If the unit is already in any of the 
two failed states, we assume that it remains in that state (no repair).  
At any particular point in time (at any particular slice), the analysis yields a fixed 
probability for the tank to be at a certain level. These levels are then used to determine 
whether or not the tank overflows or dries out. The probabilities at each time slice are 
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shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. The data from the Monte Carlo simulation are taken from 
[Mar96] and are generated from 105 simulations. The agreement between the two 
techniques is very good. 
 
Table 3.1. Conditional probability function for control unit 1. 
State at t State at t  +Δ
W CU 1 XU1# 
  ON OFF FAILED ON 
FAILED 
OFF 
hsp W H< <  ON 0 1-2 1λ Δ  1λ Δ  1λ Δ  
hsp W lsp≤ ≤  ON 0 1-2 1λ Δ  1λ Δ  1λ Δ  
L W lsp< <  ON 1-2 1λ Δ  0 1λ Δ  1λ Δ  
hsp W H< <  OFF 0 1-2 1λ Δ  1λ Δ  1λ Δ  
hsp W lsp≤ ≤  OFF 0 1-2 1λ Δ  1λ Δ  1λ Δ  
L W lsp< <  OFF 1-2 1λ Δ  0 1λ Δ  1λ Δ  
any FAILED OFF 0 0 0 1 
any FAILED ON 0 0 1 0 
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Figure 3.5. Dryout probability calculated using BN and Monte Carlo. The Monte Carlo 
result is from [Mar96]. 
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Figure 3.6. Overflow probability calculated using BN and Monte Carlo. The Monte Carlo 
result is from [Mar96]. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Alternating Conditional Expectation 
 
In this chapter, we will introduce the use of the alternating conditional expectation (ACE) 
to construct a surrogate for any transient analysis code. ACE is a nonparametric, 
nonlinear multivariate regression technique that determines the optimal functional 
transformation of both the dependent variable and a set of independent variables such that 
a linear relationship between the transformed dependent and independent variables is 
maximized. However, before we discuss ACE in more detail, we will start explaining in 
Section 4.1 why a code surrogate is needed in our work. Section 4.2 will present the ACE 
algorithm and some of the physical interpretations that can be associated with the 
technique. We will also give a brief outline of the algorithm that is used to implement 
ACE. The final section of this chapter will apply the ACE technique to a simple function 
so that the benefit of ACE will become clearer. 
 
4.1 Need for a Code Surrogate 
Generally, the behavior of a reactor during accident-induced transients depends on the 
configuration of the plant components which themselves will vary with time. Advanced 
reactor analysis codes often will have the ability to automatically adjust the state of the 
components in response to a change in the reactor state variable. For instance, the 
auxiliary feedwater pumps can be set to automatically turn on when the water level in a 
32 
 
steam generator drops below a limit. This capability of these analysis codes to model 
automatic control means that it is easier for the analyst to focus on specific components 
important to the study and let the code adjusts the state of the other components. 
However, in risk analysis, we are interested in finding the overall probability of core 
damage, given any possible configuration changes of the reactor. This means that we 
need to specify probabilities of having a component transitioning to different states (e.g., 
a valve changing its state from OFF to ON) given the state of the plant. To perform this 
type of analysis, the analysis code needs to be run at all the possible (or at least most 
likely) combinations of plant component states and then determine how the transient 
behavior is affected. Considering that a detailed model of a reactor will include many 
components with many states, the number of all possible combinations is quite large. The 
run times for these analysis codes for a given case can vary from 10 minutes to several 
hours. It would take an impractical amount of time to use these codes to study all the 
possible variations of component states and determine the impact on reactor safety. 
 The idea behind a code surrogate is that we can replace the detailed but slow 
running analysis code with a somewhat less detailed but much faster representation. A 
surrogate is basically a function that specifies a deterministic relationship between a 
dependent variable of interest and a set of independent variables. For instance, we may be 
interested in a function that expresses the peak clad temperature in terms of coolant flow 
rate, pressure, and temperature. This surrogate will then be used instead of the simulation 
code if we want to know how the clad temperature changes as a function of variations in 
the coolant flow rate, pressure, and temperature.  
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 A given surrogate will most likely have a range of applicability. It is important 
that if we use values of the independent variables that are far outside the range that we 
use to construct the surrogate, then the surrogate be checked against the original code. 
The work presented in this dissertation uses several layers of surrogates. In the example 
above, we pick the flow rate, pressure, and temperature as the independent variables. 
However, these are not variables over which we have direct control. Therefore, these 
variables are in turn expressed as a function of other independent variables. The choice of 
independent variables to use for a given surrogate is made mostly from experience or 
judgments made from understanding of the basic physics. In this regard, the accuracy of a 
particular surrogate model will vary from case to case. 
 In the next section, we will present the ACE algorithm which we use to build the 
various surrogates used in this work. We will defer the discussion of the actual surrogate 
construction until Chapter 6. 
 
4.2 Overview of ACE 
In linear regression analysis over p independent variables, we are interested in finding the 
coefficients such that the equation 0 1, ,..., pa a a
 0
1
p
i i
i
Y a a X ε
=
= +∑ +  (4.1) 
holds. Here, ε is the error, Y is the dependent variable and ’s are the independent 
variables. Linear regression works well if the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables are known to be linear. However, in a more general case, linear 
regression may give erroneous results. This leads to the development on nonparametric 
iX
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regression techniques which do not assume the functional form of the relationship. These 
nonparametric techniques are divided into two broad classes: those that perform some 
kind of transformation on the dependent variable, and those that do not. The ACE model 
falls into the former class. The ACE algorithm is first proposed by Breiman and 
Friedman [Bre85] as a way to estimate the optimal transformations of both the dependent 
and independent variables. By optimal transformation, we mean a transformation that 
reduces the mean squared error. A different criterion for optimality will lead to a different 
regression algorithm. 
 The ACE model expresses the transformed function θ of the dependent variable Y 
in terms of the transformed functions iφ of the independent variables ,  iX {1,2,.., }:i p∈
 
1
( ) ( ) ,
p
j j
j
Y Xθ φ
=
ε= +∑  (4.2) 
where the noise ε has a zero mean and is independent of all the ’s. The ACE 
algorithm aims to minimize the squared error 
iX
  (4.3) 
2
2
1
1
( , ,..., ) ( ) ( ) .
p
p
j
er E Y Xθ φ φ θ φ
=
⎛ ⎞= −⎜⎝ ⎠∑ j j ⎟
For a given value of θ and ,j j i,φ ≠ the value of iφ that minimizes Eq. (4.3) (i.e., the 
solution of the minimization problem) is: 
 
,
( ) ( ) ( ) |
p
i i j j i
j j i
.X E Y X Xφ θ φ
≠
⎛ ⎞= −⎜⎝ ⎠∑ ⎟  (4.4) 
Likewise, for a fixed jφ , the θ  that minimizes Eq. (4.3) is: 
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 1
1
( ) |
( ) ,
( ) |
p
i i
i
p
i i
i
E X Y
Y
E X Y
φ
θ
φ
=
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝= ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
⎠  (4.5) 
where ( )• is the square-norm. The name “alternative conditional expectation” comes 
from the fact that the ACE algorithm alternates between solving the minimization 
problem with θ fixed [Eq. (4.4)] and keeping jφ fixed [Eq. (4.5)]. The discussion above 
can be cast into an algorithmic form shown below [Bre85]: 
(i) Initialize: set [ ]( )
var[ ]
Y E YY
Y
θ −=  
(ii) Obtain new φ :  
1,
( ) ( ) ( ) |
p
k k i i k
i i k
X E Y X Xφ θ φ
= ≠
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
(iii) Obtain new θ : 1
1
( ) |
( )
var ( ) |
p
i i
i
p
i i
i
E X Y
Y
E X Y
φ
θ
φ
=
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑
∑
 
(iv) Alternate between (ii) and (iii) until ( 2( ) ( ))E Y Xθ φ− does not change. 
 
4.3 Data Smoothing 
Data smoothing is performed when we are interested in finding the behavior of the 
dependent variable Y as a function of a set of N independent variables . 
The term “smoothing” is used since the output of a smoother generally has less 
fluctuation (i.e., smoother) than the original variable. In the derivation of the ACE 
algorithm in Section 4.2, we used the conditional expectation value of the transformed 
function given the original variable to perform the iteration. However, this works only if 
, {1,.., }iX i N∈
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we know the joint distribution functions of these variables. Without the distribution 
functions, we will not be able to calculate the conditional expectation and hence use ACE 
directly. This is where a smoother comes into play. The results of the smoothing process 
is used to replace the conditional expectations in the ACE algorithm. Note that since the 
smoothing process itself is nonparametric, its use in the ACE algorithm does not remove 
the nonparametric nature of the algorithm. 
 To formalize the notion of data smoothing, we will follow the development in 
[Bre85]. Suppose we have N sets of p independent variables. Mathematically, we can 
define this data set to be the set whose elements is a point in the p-
dimensional space. For this data set, define  to be a space of all real-valued 
functions Y whose domain is our data set . We can think of  as a space 
of all the possible dependent variables. Also define 
1{ ,..., }NX X
1{
iX
{1,
( )F X
,...,X }NX
(
( )F X
), .., }jF x j p∈ to be a space of all 
real-valued functions defined on the set 1{ ,...,j }NjX X . We can think of as a space 
of all possible functions of the independent variable 
( )jF x
.jx  The data smooth S of X on jx  is a 
mapping : ( ) ( )jS F X F X→ that is defined for every data set. For every Y in , we 
write the corresponding element in  as and its values as  Note 
that with this definition of smoothing, a linear regression that fits a line through a set of 
data point can be considered a smoothing technique. However, since linear regression 
assumes a linear relationship, it is not usually considered to be a real smoother.  
(F X
).kjX
)
( )jF x ( |S Y )jX ( |S Y
 An example of a simple smoothing technique is a running-mean smoother. 
Suppose we have a set of N data points of the form ( , ), {1,.., }i ix y i N∈ where ix is the 
independent variable and is the dependent variable. For any given value of iy ix , we can 
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define a set that contains k points closest to the left of ( )S iN x ix  and k points closest to 
the right of ix . A running mean smoothing function is then defined as: 
 
( )
( ) ( ).
S
i
i
j N x
S x Ave y
∈ j
=  (4.6) 
The set is referred to as the symmetric nearest neighborhood.  What we are doing 
here is essentially averaging the values of the dependent variables within a certain 
neighborhood. The averaging process will smooth out any variations in the dependent 
variable. A big disadvantage of this technique is that in cases where the values of the 
outliers are very different from the values at the interior points, we will lose the 
information on the behaviors of the dependent variables near those outliers. To alleviate 
this problem, the running mean smoothing technique can be generalized to use other 
forms of neighborhood selection (including non-symmetric ones). 
( )ix
1 2ay by
SN
 The choice of the smoothing technique to use determines the output of the ACE 
algorithm. In this dissertation, we will use the technique originally used in [Bre85]  
known as a “supersmoother” which basically performs a linear fit within a neighborhood 
of the point of interest. The size of the neighborhood (i.e., the window width) is allowed 
to vary, being governed the median of the neighborhood [Fri82]. 
 We will conclude this section by noting that the ACE technique has only been 
proven to converge if the smoother used in the algorithm is linear. (A linear smoother 
satisfies for any constants a and b.) Nevertheless, 
the ACE algorithm has been successfully employed in many applications even with a 
more general choice of smoothers [Bre85].  
1 2( | ) ( | ) (S x aS y x bS y x+ = + | )
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4.4  A Simple Demonstration of ACE 
In this section, we will demonstrate the use of the ACE technique to analyze a data set 
that is synthetically generated from a known functional relationship. This example is 
adapted from [Wan04]. Consider the equation: 
 2 31 2 3 4 54 sin(4 ) 0.1 .
Ye X X X X X ε= + + + + + +  (4.7) 
The variables are assumed to be independent  with a uniform 
distribution between -1 and +1. The noise 
, {1,2,3,4,5}iX i∈
ε is independent of and is assumed to be 
normally distributed with a zero mean and unit variance. We now sample 500 data points 
from this distribution to generate a set of independent variables and their associated 
dependent variable Y. With the data set generated, we wish to apply the 
ACE algorithm to try to recover the functional dependence of Y on the ’s and compare 
the results to Eq. (4.7). Of course in practice, we will only have the 500 sample points of 
the set ( without knowing the relationship between the variables. 
iX
1 2 5( ,..., , )X Y,X X
iX
1 2 5,..., , )X Y,X X
 Faced with an unknown relation between the dependent variable Y and the 
independent variables , one naïve approach may be to look at the 
scatter plot of Y versus the individual  with the hope of guessing a functional form of 
the dependence. Such a plot is shown in Figure 4.1. Looking at the plots, we may perhaps 
guess that Y may be a sinusoidal function of while the dependence on the other 
variables may be linear.  
, {1,2,3,4,5}iX i∈
iX
1X
 If we now apply the ACE algorithm to the data set, we arrive at the relations 
shown in Figure 4.2.  As can be seen from the figure, the ACE technique is able to 
recover the functional form of the dependent variables: sinusoidal function for , 1X
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absolute value function for , quadratic function for , cubic function for , and a 
linear function for  The dependent variable Y is transformed to an exponential 
function, as expected from the relations in Eq. (4.7).  
2X 3X 4X
5.X
 
 
Figure 4.1. Plots of the dependent variable Y against each of the five independent 
variables . iX
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Figure 4.2. ACE tranformations of the dependent and independent variables. 
 
From the discussion in the previous section, we know that the degree in which ACE can 
determine the proper correlation can be seen by examining the plot of vs ( )Yθ ( )i i
i
Xφ∑ . 
In the ideal case, the plot should be linear since that is the assumption made in the 
development of the theory. Figure 4.3 shows that for our example, the relationship is 
indeed very close to linear. 
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Figure 4.3. Transformed dependent variable θ as a function of the sum of the transformed 
independent variables iφ . 
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CHAPTER 5 
MODELING THE LOSS OF FEEDWATER TRANSIENT 
 
5.1 Overview of the Feed and Bleed Operation 
In a pressurized water reactor, the primary means of removing heat from the core 
during both the normal operation and after shutdown is via the steam generator (SG). 
Depending on the specific plant, the secondary system is composed of either 3 or 4 closed, 
two-phase loops that is operated at a pressure of about 800 psi (compared to ~2200 psi 
for the primary loop). During operation, heat generated from the core is transported via 
the primary water to the steam generator. The energy is transferred to the feedwater in the 
secondary loop causing the water to boil. The water-iiiiiiiiiiisteam mixture that is 
generated is then passed through steam separators which extract the liquid water back 
into the steam generator. The dried steam is fed to the turbine which extracts energy from 
the steam (this energy is converted to electricity); the steam passes through the main 
condenser which converts the steam into liquid water. The water is then pumped back 
into the steam generator via the feedwater system. The diagram of the secondary system 
is shown in Figure 5.1.  
For the reactor during a post-trip, the flow of the steam exiting the steam 
generator is redirected via the main turbine bypass system and flows directly into the 
condenser. In the event of a loss of main feedwater in accidents such as feedwater pump 
failure or leak in the main feedwater loop, the steam generator will receive water from the 
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auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. The AFW system draws water from various 
available water sources or from the condensate storage tank and feeds the water into the 
steam generator. However, unlike the case of the main feedwater, steam produced from 
the boiling of the AFW is usually vented directly into the atmosphere through the 
atmospheric dump valve. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Normal pathway of feedwater flow. Diagram adapted from [NRC90a]. 
 
On the primary side, there are also systems in place to provide backup water 
needed for heat removal from the core. In the event of a loss of coolant (through a pipe 
break, for example), the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) can inject borated water 
from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). The ECCS system comprises three 
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distinct modes of water injection. If the primary system pressure is near the operating 
pressure, the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps can supply water to the cold 
leg of the primary loop. These pumps can deliver water at a relatively low rate compared 
to the other ECCS injection modes, but can operate at a relatively high system pressure. 
At lower pressure, the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pumps can provide further 
injection via the cold leg. There is also a third ECCS component in place called the 
accumulator or the safety injection tank. This is basically a pressurized tank filled with 
water that is connected to the primary system. When the primary pressure drops below a 
setpoint pressure, water will be discharged from the tank into the primary loops.  Note 
that in our discussion in the remainder of the dissertation, the HPSI pump is also referred 
to as the centrifugal charging pump (CCP) while the LPSI pump is called the SI pump.   
 In the event of the loss of main feedwater coupled with the failure of the AFW 
system to actuate, the reactor will automatically scram from either the low SG level 
signal or high primary pressure signal. In either case, the water level in the steam 
generator will gradually be depleted due to boiling since the decay heat generated by the 
core will remain relatively high. If no action is taken by the operator, all the secondary 
water in the SG will eventually be depleted which will lead to a severely degraded heat 
removal capacity of the secondary system. The primary water will eventually reach 
saturation temperature and boiling will occur. Ultimately, the core will be uncovered, 
leading to fuel cladding damage. 
 To prevent the scenario described above from occurring, the feed and bleed (F&B) 
operation can be initiated to provide an alternate means of heat removal. This involves 
injecting water into the primary system via the ECCS pumps while venting the steam 
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from the power-operated relief valves (PORVs) located at the top of the pressurizer. The 
boiling that occurs in the primary will remove the decay heat. The water discharged 
through the PORVs is stored in the pressurizer quench tank. However, with prolonged 
F&B operation, the tank will become full, at which point the rupture disks on the tank 
will burst, releasing the water into the containment sump. In some plants, this water may 
be pumped back through the LPSI if necessary [Poc02]. Figure 5.2 shows the relevant 
pathways involved in the F&B operation. 
 
Figure 5.2. Coolant flow path during the feed and bleed operation. Diagram adapted from 
[NRC90a]. 
 
 The F&B operation is usually done at the primary pressure near the PORV set 
point [Rev07]. This pressure is above the shutoff head for the LPSI pumps, therefore only 
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the HPSI pumps will be available. On some PWRs, even the HPSI pump will not have 
enough power to inject water at high pressure. In this case, the PORVs may be manually 
opened to relieve the pressure before the feed operation is initiated. This is known as 
bleed and feed [Rot94]. 
 The emergency guideline for plant operators in the loss of heat sink event is 
shown in Figure 5.3.  The major indicators to initiate the F&B operation include a low 
steam generator level (<27% of wide range level in any 3 SGs) and a high pressurizer 
level (pressure > 2335 psi which is the PORV set point). Note that the HPSI pump is first 
actuated, and if that fails, the procedure calls for the actuation of the LPSI pump. Once at 
least one pump is verified to be functioning, the PORVs are manually opened to provide 
the bleed path. 
 The success of the F&B operation depends on the time in which the operation is 
initiated and on the primary water temperature at the time of initiation [Rev07]. In 
addition, the number of pumps that are available for the injection, the number of PORVs 
that can be opened, and the injection rate will be important in determining the heat 
removal capacity of the F&B operation. In a static event tree that is used to analyze the 
success criteria of the F&B operation, the dependence of the outcome on the number of 
PORVs or pumps that are available for the F&B operation can be represented. However, 
the required feed rate depends on the primary water temperature which is a function of 
both the F&B initiation delay, the scram delay, and the system pressure. To include these 
parameters into the analysis, the ET would need to find a limit for these parameters above 
which the outcome is assumed to be a failure. For example, suppose that a transient 
simulation indicates that the F&B initiation delay time above 40 minutes will result in the  
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Figure 5.3. Emergency guideline associated with the loss of feedwater event. The 
flowchart is adapted from [Wes93]. 
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clad temperature exceeding some safe limit. In the event tree, this criteria will be used to 
test the branching of the accident progression. However, if the plant condition is different  
from that assumed during the ET construction (for instance, suppose the reactor was not 
operating at full power), then the 40 minutes limit will no longer be valid. In this case, a 
new ET with a different branching criterion will be required.  
 If the ET model is aware of the plant state and changes accordingly, then the 
problem will have been solved. However, it is difficult for the analyst to estimate all the 
possible conditions of the plant and construct a risk model for every case. One way to 
alleviate the problem is to couple the risk model with the plant dynamic model. This way, 
the success or failure criteria can be updated automatically inside the model. In chapter 7, 
we will show how the code surrogate using ACE (which serves as the plant dynamic 
model) can be used in conjunction with the Bayesian network (which serves as the risk 
model) to perform risk assessment in a way that accounts for different plant behaviors. 
 
5.2 The Zion Plant Description 
The Zion Station-Unit 1 plant is a 4-loop pressurized water reactor of the Westinghouse 
design. It is located in northern Illinois and Commonwealth Edison began its operation in 
1974. However, it was shut down in 1998. The plant had a rated capacity of 1095 MWe 
or 3411 MWth.  Some basic plant data, including information on the ECCS system, is 
shown in Table 5.1.  
The plant is equipped with three trains of AFW pumps, each with enough capacity 
to feed all four steam generators. Two of these trains are fed by motor driven pumps 
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while the third train is fed by a steam turbine driven pump. Failure of the AFW system 
means that none of the three trains delivers the auxiliary feedwater at their rated capacity. 
One feature of the Zion-1 ECCS is that during the recirculation phase, the ECCS 
pump can realign its suction valve so that water is drawn from the containment sump 
instead of the RWST. This water is pumped into the inlet of the LPSI pumps which can 
be injected back into the primary system. For a prolonged F&B operation, the pressurizer 
sump tank will overflow and the water will be collected in the containment sump. The 
ability to draw water from the sump means that the available supply of the water for the 
injection portion of the F&B operation will not be depleted even when the RWST is 
empty.  
 
Table 5.1. Some data for the Zion-1 reactor. Data from [NRC90a] and [Com82]. 
Thermal Capacity 3411 MWth 
Electric Capacity 1095 MWe 
Number of Fuel Assemblies 193 
Number of Fuel Elements in Assembly 264 
Number of RCS PORV 2 
Number of RCS SRV 3 
Number of Charging Pump 2 Centrifugal, 1 Positive Displacement 
Charging System Capacity - Centrifugal 150 gpm at 2800 psig 
Charging System Capacity - PD 98 gpm 
Number of SI Pump 2 
SI Pump Capacity 400 gpm at 1084 psig 
PORV Capacity 64.6 lb/hr/MWth 
PORV Lowest Setpoint 2335 psig 
SRV Capacity 129,200 lb/hr 
SRV Lowest Setpoint 2485 psig 
 
CHAPTER 6 
Modeling of Zion-1 Using RELAP5 
 
This chapter will introduce RELAP5, the system analysis code that we use to simulate the 
loss-of-feedwater accident in the Zion-1 nuclear power station.  In section 6.1, we will 
briefly discuss the main features, the representation of key physics, and the modeling 
capabilities of RELAP5 and how some these capabilities are used in our analysis. In 
section 6.2, we will describe the modeling of the Zion-1 plant starting from the “typical 
PWR” input deck that is included in the RELAP5 installation CD and the modifications 
that were necessary. The “typical PWR” input file itself is based on a detailed Zion-1 
model, but it has some important parameters and tables removed due to proprietary 
considerations. This original model of Zion-1 is designed for the analysis of a loss-of-
coolant (LOCA) accident, so some details that are important for the loss-of-feedwater 
(LOFW) transient (for instance, the pressurizer safety valves) are not included. Some 
additions and changes described in section 6.3 are necessary to make the deck applicable 
to the LOFW transient.  In section 6.4, we describe the steady state and transient 
benchmark of our model against the published results. 
 
6.1 Overview of RELAP5 
RELAP5/MOD3.3 (Reactor Excursion and Loss of Coolant Analysis Program) [NRC01] 
is a one-dimensional analysis code designed for the analysis of the transient behaviors of 
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light water reactors during postulated accident conditions. The code allows the modeler 
to construct hydrodynamic volumes which can be connected via different types of 
junction with a prescribed boundary condition such as flow rate or temperature. 
Conductive heat transfer between several adjacent (but hydrodynamically isolated) 
volumes can be specified via the use of heat structure. Heat structures are also used in the 
solid structure that generates heat such as in the fuel rod or pressurizer heater. Using the 
appropriate connections of the hydrodynamics volume and heat structure, both the 
primary and secondary systems of the light water reactor can be modeled.  
Controls of the reactor component can be achieved by the use of trip cards. Trips 
are basically logic statements that specify when the trip will be true based on a set of 
inputs. The input to a trip statement can be either other trips or variables that describe the 
state of a plant component. For instance, a trip logic can be used to represent the pressure 
where the valve should open or the point in time when a pump should start to coast down. 
Through the use of appropriate trip combinations, a sophisticated set of control functions 
and settings can be specified in the RELAP5 model.  
Internally, the RELAP5 modeling is broken into the fluid model, the heat transfer 
model, and the reactor kinetics mode. The code uses a two-fluid, six-equation model to 
describe the fluid behaviors. The two-fluid model allows the treatment of the water/steam 
mixture and any non-condensable gases that may be present. For reactor kinetics, a point 
kinetics model is used. Point kinetics treats the neutron flux as a product of the space-
dependent and the time-dependent functions. The flux shape function is assumed to be 
constant in time, while the function describing the magnitude of the flux is time 
dependent. Heat conduction is modeled using the standard integral formulation of the 
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conduction equation. In addition to the three physics models mentioned above, RELAP5 
also allows analysts to build control systems which will automatically control certain 
plant components such as valves and heaters based on plant variables. Unlike trips whose 
output are binary, a controller allows the specification of the boundary condition at a 
node based on values at another node. For instance, the flow rate of the feedwater can be 
automatically adjusted based on the mass balance of the steam generator. This capability 
for modeling of the control system allows automatic plant controls and equipment 
setpoints to be accurately represented. 
 
6.2 Modeling of Relevant Physics in RELAP5 
This section will briefly mention some of the main physics models that are used in 
RELAP5. Since most of these models use the volume and time-averaged value of the 
variables as the parameter, all the variables listed in this section are cell-averaged 
quantities and will not be explicitly designated in the individual equations. 
 
6.2.1 Conservation Equations 
The description and equations presented in this section are adapted from [Ran89] and 
[NRC01]. RELAP5 uses a six-equation model to represent the behavior of the fluid. 
These six equations represent the conservation of mass, momentum, and energy for each 
of the two phases of the fluid. The conservation of mass for the kth phase is represented 
by: 
 1( ) ( )k k k k k kv At A x
α ρ α ρ ,∂ ∂+ = Γ∂ ∂  (6.1) 
where 
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 volume fraction of phase ,
 density of phase ,
 fluid velocity of phase ,
 cross sectional area, and
 mass generation rate per unit volume for phase .
k
k
k
k
k
k
v k
A
k
α
ρ
=
=
=
=
Γ =
 
 Here, the subscript denotes either the fluid or the gas phase. The first term on 
the LHS represents the change in mass due to a change in density. This change may be 
due to the thermal expansion of the coolant following an increase in temperature or a 
contraction due to a pressure drop after a relief valve is opened. The second term 
describes the balance between mass inflow and outflow from a unit volume. The mass 
generation term accounts for phase change (boiling or condensation) of the coolant. Note 
that since there can only be two phases in Eq. (6.1), we also require: 
{ , }k f g∈
 .f gΓ = −Γ  (6.2) 
Generally, the phasic momentum equations are a set of three equations, 
representing each of the three directions in a 3-dimensional space. However, with the 
assumption that the flow is only aligned in one direction, we can neglect the average 
velocity in the other two coordinates. The conservation of momentum equation in the 
flow direction becomes, for the gas phase: 
 
( )
( )
( )
21 FWG( )
2
( ) FIG( )
,
g g
g g g g g g g X g g
g gI g g g g f
g f g f
g f f g
v v P
gA A A B A Adt x x
A v v A v v
v v v v
C A v v
t x x
α ρ α ρ α α ρ α ρ
α ρ
α α ρ
∂ ∂ ∂+ = − + −∂ ∂
+Γ − − −
∂ − ∂ ∂− + −
v
∂ ∂ ∂
 (6.3) 
and for the liquid phase: 
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 (6.4) 
where 
pressure,
 coefficient of virtual mass,
FWG, FWF = wall frictional drag coefficient for the gas and liquid phases, respectively,
FIG, FIF = interphase drag coefficient for the gas and liquid phases, 
P
C
=
=
respectively,
 body force in the flow direction
, interfacial velocity for the gas and liquid phases, respectively.
x
gI fI
B
v v
=
=
 
The terms on the right side of Eqs. (6.3) and (6.4) represent, in the order shown in the 
equations, the pressure gradient, the body force (such as from pump head), wall friction, 
momentum  transfer due to interphase mass transfer, interphase friction drag, and the 
force due to mass acceleration (also called the virtual mass). Note that the interphase drag 
coefficients are linear in the relative phase velocity. 
 The thermal energy conservation equation is: 
 
* '
1( ) ( ) ( )
                                                         DISS ,
k
k k k k k k k k k wk ik
ig k w k k
PU U v A P v A Q
t A x t A x
h h
Qαα ρ α ρ α∂∂ ∂ ∂+ = − − +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+Γ +Γ +
+
 (6.5) 
where 
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* *
' '
, phasic wall heat transfer rates per unit volume
, phasic enthalpies associated with bulk interface mass transfer
, phasic enthalpies associated with wall interface mass transfer
v
wf wg
g f
g f
ig
Q Q
h h
h h
=
=
=
Γ = apor generation from energy exchange
vapor generation due to wall heat transfer effects
Q , interface heat transfer
DISS ,DISS phasic energy dissipation (wall friction, pump effects).
w
if ig
f g
Q
Γ =
=
=
 
The first term on the LHS describes the heat added into the control volume (for instance, 
through a heat structure). The second term represents the net heat flow into the control 
volume by mean of the motion of the fluid (convective heat transfer). The RHS describes 
the various looses due to friction or the transfer of energy between the two phases. 
 
 
6.2.2 Heat Conduction Representation 
A heat conduction model is used in RELAP5 to calculate the heat transfer across the solid 
portion of the reactor components such as across the fuel cladding and across the U-tubes 
carrying the primary coolant inside the steam generator.  The integral form of the heat 
conduction equation is: 
 ( , )( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,T x tx T dV k x T T x t dA S x t
t
ρ ∂ = ∇ • +∂∫ ∫ ∫ dV  (6.6) 
where 
volumetric heat capacity,
 thermal conductivity,
 temperature,
 heat source.
k
T
S
ρ =
=
=
=
 
The surface heat flux required to specify the boundary condition can be calculated as: ''q
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'' ( )
,
surfaceq h T T
Tk
z
= −
∂= − ∂
 (6.7) 
where it is assumed that the z vector is the outward normal vector relative to the surface 
of the boundary. RELAP5 has several correlations built into the code which are used to 
calculate the heat transfer coefficient h, depending on the flow condition of the 
hydrodynamics volume. Once the appropriate flow type is selected by the code and the 
heat transfer coefficient calculated, the surface heat flux in Eq. (6.7) is used as a 
boundary condition to the heat conduction equation (6.6).  
 
6.3  Modeling of the Zion Plant 
Figure 6.1 shows the nodalization of the hydrodynamic volumes of the “typical PWR” 
input deck that is included as a sample input deck in the RELAP5 installation. The 
reactor pressure vessel is modeled with 15 volumes comprising the inlet annulus 
(volumes 300, 305, 310), the downcomer, the downcomer bypass (volumes 315, 320), the 
lower plenum (volumes 322-325, 330), the upper plenum (volumes 340, 345, 350), the 
upper head (volumes 355, 356), and the core (volume 335).  
The core volume is represented with a PIPE component and is subdivided into 6 
nodes. Two heat structures are connected to volume 335. The first heat structure, divided 
into 6 axial and 2 radial segments, models the core barrel. This structure connects volume 
335 with the downcomer bypass represented by volume 320. No heat generation is 
present in this heat structure. The second heat structure represents the fuel pins. It is 
divided into 6 axial and 16 radial segments. The 16 radial segments represent the fuel 
material (6 segments), the air gap (2 segments), and the fuel cladding (8 segments). 
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Even though Zion-1 is a 4-loop reactor, the “typical PWR” model only has two 
loops. One of the loops, labeled as the “intact loop”, actually represents a merging of the 
3 physical loops. The “broken loop” is one physical loop. This means that parameters 
such as flow area and flow rate for the “intact loop” is three times that of the “broken 
loop”. (The reason for this merging is that the original deck is designed for a LOCA 
analysis and so the loops that do not contain the break are merged to reduce run time.) 
Except for the pressurizer, the layout of the broken and intact loop is identical. 
The pressurizer, represented by volume 150, is a PIPE component that is divided 
into 6 segments. It is connected to the hot leg of the intact loop (it is moved to the broken 
loop in the final model) via the surge line (volume 152). The top portion of the 
pressurizer contains an outlet to the PORV (represented by a trip valve 157) which drains 
into volume 158, representing the quench tank. 
For each of the steam generators in the two loops, the U-tubes (volume 204 and 
108) are modeled with a PIPE component and are each divided into 8 segments. The loss 
coefficients and hydraulic diameters for these volumes are explicitly specified using 
appropriate values so that the total flow rate and area computed by the code agree with 
plant data.  
The ECCS is represented by two charging pumps (volumes 193 and 293), two 
LPSI pumps (volumes 191 and 291), and two accumulators (volumes 190 and 290). The 
sources of the water for all the ECCS pumps are assumed to be infinite for the purpose of 
the simulation. The dependence of the flow capacity of both the HPSI and LPSI systems 
are specified via the time-dependent junction which specifies the inject rate as a function 
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of the primary pressure. These junctions are activated by the appropriate trip signal that 
can be triggered either manually or automatically via a low pressure signal. 
The secondary side is modeled by 12 volumes. Volumes 170 and 270 have a heat 
structure connection to volumes 108 and 204, respectively. This connection represents 
the heat exchanger portion of the steam generator. The heat structure connecting the 
primary and secondary systems has 16 axial and 8 radial segments. The main feedwater 
(volumes 182 and 282) and the AFW (volumes 184 and 284) are connected to the steam 
generator via a branch node (volumes 174 and 274). As in the case of the ECCS, the 
source of water for these systems is assumed to be infinite.  The steam dome is 
represented by two volumes for each steam generator: a BRANCH component (volumes 
180 and 280), and a PIPE volume (volumes 178 and 278) .The steam separator is 
modeled by the steam separator component (volumes 171 and 271). 
Five materials are defined in the model: the uranium oxide fuel, the air gap, 
zircaloy-4 (fuel clad), inconel (U-tubes), and stainless steel (structural components). Each 
of these materials has a corresponding table for the temperature-dependent thermal 
conductivity and specific heat capacity.  
We made modifications to the typical PWR input deck described in the preceding 
paragraphs to improve the agreement between our model and the data in various 
published reports for both the steady-state benchmarking and the LOFW transient 
scenario.  
1. The first modification is the addition of the pressurizer heater and spray line. In the 
original input file, these two components necessary for pressure control are absent and we 
noticed that it was difficult to achieve a steady state with the correct pressure. The spray 
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line is added so that it draws water from the cold leg (volume 212) and sprays water from 
the top of the pressurizer (segment 1 of volume 150). Both the heater and the spray are 
controlled via a proportional controller which takes input from the pressure error at the 
pressurizer volume.  
2. The second modification involves moving the pressurizer from the “intact loop” to the 
“broken loop”. Recall that the intact loop is really three physical loops merged into one. 
We felt that the behavior of the pressurizer will be more accurate if it is connected to a 
loop whose flow condition is closer to the physical loop. 
3. The original deck has one PORV to represent the two PORVs that are actually present 
in the plant. However, for the LOFW transient, there are situations where the PORVs do 
not have sufficient relief capacity to drain the expanding primary coolant which leads to 
an increase in the primary pressure large enough so that the code safety valves open. 
These safety valves were not originally included in the model and had to be added. The 
control setpoints for the PORVs and the safety relief valves are shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Setpoints for primary relief valve operation. 
 Setpoint Pressure (psia) 
PORV open 2350 
PORV close 2330 
Relief valve open 2535 
Relief valve close 2460 
 
4. The control systems for the feedwater system, the steam dump valves, the emergency 
injection system, and the PORVs were also modified to make them more consistent with 
the actual behavior of these components. Trip controls were attached to these components 
so that they actuate when control setpoints are reached. We also had to decrease the pump 
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velocity by 3% to get a better agreement  with the steady state values in the final safety 
analysis report (FSAR) [Com82].  
5. Finally, the control parameters for the steam separator in the steam generator were 
adjusted to make the separator function properly in a low flow rate situation. The 
VOVER parameter specifies the void fraction above which the steam will be treated as 
pure vapor. Similarly, the VUNDER parameter specifies the void fraction limit below 
which the steam-water mixture will be treated as pure liquid. During the LOFW transient, 
the steam flow rate drops low enough so that the default values of these parameters were 
not adequate. We decreased the limit to 1.0E-3 for both parameters. 
 
6.4  Benchmarking of the RELAP5 Model 
The benchmarking for both the steady-state case and the LOFW transient case is done to 
ensure that our Zion-1 model adequately represents the transient behavior during the 
accident. In the tables and description below, our Zion-1 model will be referred to as the 
TPWR model.  The steady state comparison of the TPWR model and the values from the 
FSAR is shown in Table 6.2. We see that for most parameters, the agreement is within 1% 
of the FSAR values.  
 Figures 6.2 through 6.6 compare the LOFW transient results between the 
TPWR model and the values obtained using the TRAC code as presented in [Dem82]. 
(The FSAR does not have results for the complete LOFW transient.) Table 6.3 lists the 
sequence of event for the case used in this benchmarking. The transient starts with the 
loss of main feedwater, followed by the reactor coolant pump trip and the reactor scram 
at 1 second. The AFW should come on 15 seconds after the loss of main feedwater but in 
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this case, it fails to do so. At 60 seconds into the transient,  the atmospheric relief valve 
on the secondary side opens in response to high steam generator pressure. Note that the 
closing of the main steam isolation valve occurs coincident with the reactor scram. 
 
Table 6.2. Comparison of key parameters between the RELAP5 model and the FSAR. 
  FSAR TPWR Model 
Vessel Inlet Temp (F) 530 529 
Vessel Outlet Temp (F) 594 593 
Coolant Flow Rate (lbm/s/loop) 9374 9431 
Pressurizer Pressure (psia) 2248 2252 
Pressurizer Temp (F) 653 653 
SG Steam Exit Temp (F) 506 505 
SG Pressure, shell side (psia) 719 719 
SG Steam Exit Flow Rate (lbm/s) 972 971 
 
Table 6.3. Sequence of event for the loss-of-feedwater transient benchmark. 
Time (s) Event 
0.0 Loss of main feedwater 
1 RCP trip 
1 Reactor scram 
15 AFW system fails 
60 Atmospheric relief valves open 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the reactor power as a function of time. Both the TPWR model 
and the TRAC model that is used in [Dem82] use the American Nuclear Society Standard 
ANS 5.1 to represent the decay power generated by fission products so we do not expect 
too much difference in the decay power between the two models. Figure 6.3 shows the 
average reactor coolant temperature as a function of time. After the RCP trip at 1 second, 
the primary coolant flow rate decreases as the coolant pumps gradually coast down to 
about 5% of the flow rate at full power (Figure 6.5).  This drop in flow rate will cause the 
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temperature of the coolant to briefly increase (this behavior is called the power-to-flow 
mismatch in [Dem82]). However, by about 10 minutes into the transient, natural 
circulation will become the dominant form of primary coolant flow and the temperature 
will reach its quasi-steady state value. During this time, the primary means of heat 
removal is through the boiling of the water inventory that remains in the steam generator 
after the loss of main feedwater. By 80 minutes, the steam generator will have depleted 
its water inventory and  the primary coolant temperature will increase until it reaches 
saturation temperature. In the period between the dryout of the steam generator and the 
boiling of the primary coolant, we see an increase of the volume of the coolant due to 
thermal expansion. This is shown in Figure 6.6, where the pressurizer becomes solid 
about 100 minutes into the transient. 
For the most part, the behavior of the reactor during the transient as calculated by 
our model agrees with the prediction from [Dem82]. The time of the steam dryout is 
different by about 10-20 minutes but we feel that this difference is small enough so that 
we can assume our model can adequately model the behavior of Zion-1 during a loss of 
feedwater transient. 
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Figure 6.2. Reactor power as a function of transient time. 
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Figure 6.3. Average coolant temperature as a function of transient time. 
 
65 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 50 100 150 200 250
St
ea
m
 G
en
er
at
or
 V
oi
d 
Fr
ac
tio
n
Time (min)
LANL
TPWR
 
Figure 6.4. Steam generator void fraction (shell side) as a function of transient time. 
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Figure 6.5. Primary coolant mass flow rate as a function of transient time. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DYNAMIC RISK ANALYSIS FOR THE LOSS-OF-FEEDWATER TRANSIENT 
 
In this chapter, we will present the analysis results of loss-of-feedwater transients coupled 
with the implementation of the F&B operating procedure for the Zion-1 plant. The 
objective of the analysis is to calculate the time-dependent core damage probability 
resulting from the LOFW transient. The RELAP5 model used for the analysis is 
described in chapter 6. Unlike the water tank example of Chapter 2, we will consider 
several independent variables simultaneously. The number of independent variables 
presents a problem in that an adequate sampling of all the possible combinations of these 
variables will take a prohibitively large number of code runs. However, using the 
appropriate conditional independence assumption, we can construct a Bayesian network 
model which will allow us to reduce the number of RELAP5 cases necessary for good 
sampling to a more manageable level.  
 The determination of the conditional independence relationships within a set of 
variables can be a subjective exercise. As we have shown in Chapter 3, conditional 
independence and (pair-wise and joint) independence do not imply one another. This 
means that even for variables that are independent, conditional independence may not 
hold given some other variable. Complicating the matter further, for a given set of 
conditional independent variables, it is often possible to construct a Bayesian network in 
many different ways, depending on the selection of the root nodes. In cases like this, the 
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choice of the appropriate network will be reduced to selecting a model that is the most 
intuitive given the knowledge of the physics of the problem. 
 
7.1 The Dynamic Bayesian Network Model for Feed and Bleed Operation 
The construction a DBN model requires us to make certain assumptions about the 
conditional independence relations of relevant plant equipment. As we have mentioned in 
Chapter 3, a DBN model that is constructed without exploiting conditional 
independencies will have little advantage over other common time-dependent analysis 
techniques such as the Markov chain in terms of efficiency. Even in situations where it is 
difficult to make a blanket statement about the conditional independency of a set of 
variables, we may still be able to construct a useful DBN model if we limit ourselves to 
an appropriate subset of the state space where the conditional independence assumption 
does apply (or at least, where conditional dependency is weak enough to ignore).   
The ability to define suitable sub-region in the state space where a particular DBN 
model is valid is exploited in the construction of the network shown in Figure 7.1. The 
dynamic network model in the figure is expanded over two time slices for clarity. Recall 
from Chapter 3 that one time slice may be thought of as one time step in the 
discretization of the time variable. For instance, slice 0 can be any time step n while slice 
1 is the next time step n+1. We should again note that unlike in numerical analysis, the 
size of the time step does not play a role in a DBN model. Rather, time difference 
between any two slice is only important when constructing the inter-slice transition 
probability.  
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The DBN model in Figure 7.1 has the variable core damage as its only leaf node. 
For simplicity, we will assume that this node has only two states: failed (representing 
core damage), and OK (representing no core damage). We are interested in the 
probability that the node will be in the failed state at any given time during the transient.  
The parent of Core Damage is the node Clad Temp. The interpretation of this statement is 
that whether or not core damage occurs depends only on the maximum clad temperature. 
Note that even though this assumption may not be valid in the general sense (other 
factors may affect the chance of core damage in other types of accidents), high clad 
temperature is the dominant indicator of core damage in the LOFW transient which 
justifies the assumption. The next step is to specify quantitative relationships between the 
root and child nodes via appropriate conditional probability functions. From the Final 
Acceptance Criteria [NRC74], the upper temperature limit for Zircaloy clad before clad 
damage occurs is 2200oF. This motivates our next assumption that any temperature 
higher than this limit will result in core damage with a probability of 1.0. We will also 
assume that clad temperatures below 1600oF will not cause core damage. The damage 
probability increases linearly between these two limits.  The relationship described here 
is shown in Figure 7.2. The triangular probability density function represents the 
uncertainty in the core damage probability. The corresponding cumulative distribution 
function is also represented for the RHS ordinate of Figure 7.2.  
Moving on to the next level in Figure 7.1, we see that Clad Temp has three 
parents: the primary coolant temperature, primary coolant pressure, and the coolant flow 
rate. This selection of parent variables will be validated in Section 7.3 when we construct 
the ACE model for Clad Temp. Unlike the case of the Core Damage node, the  
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conditional probability function for Clad Temp is deterministic in the sense that given a 
value for each of the three parent variables, we assume that we may determine the clad  
 temperature uniquely. Therefore, the conditional “probability” function needs to be 
constructed based on this deterministic relationship.  For our model, this deterministic 
function is obtained via the ACE regression.  As an aside, we note that even though the 
relationship is deterministic, the use of a probability function also allows us to use “noisy” 
or “leak” probability which can be used if Clad Temp has additional parents which are 
not modeled.  
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Figure 7.2. Relationship between the maximum fuel clad temperature and the probability 
of core damage. 
 
The node Injection Flow Rate represents the rate at which the injection system 
(both the high pressure and low pressure injection system) pumps water into the primary 
system for the feed portion of the F&B operation. The injection rate depends on the 
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number of pumps operating (represented by the nodes No. Low P SI pump and No. Hi P 
SI pump) as well as the pressure of the primary system. The dependence on the primary 
pressure arises from the pressure-dependent pumping capacity for the two pump types. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the Zion plant has two types of pump that can be used to 
inject water into the primary system during normal operation. The high pressure 
centrifugal charging pump can inject water at a higher primary system pressure but with a 
relatively low flow rate. The low pressure injection pump has a lower shutoff pressure 
but can inject water at a higher rate. The pressure dependent flow rates of the these two 
pump types are shown in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1 Flow rate capacity for the low and high pressure injection pumps. 
Primary pressure (psia) Low pressure SI pump 
High pressure charging 
pump 
Liquid Injection Rate (lbm/s) 
2620 0 2.65 
1685 0.333 7.03 
1529 1.00 7.43 
839 9.00 9.30 
15 53.6 9.70 
 
 Figure 7.1 show that the nodes  Low P SI pump and No. Hi P SI pump are also 
parents of the corresponding node in the next time slice. This is represented in the 
network by arcs originating from slice 0 pointing to nodes in slice 1. The interslice 
dependency is introduced into the model to account for possible failure of the pumps. For 
the sake of discussion, let us assume that one time slice represents 1 hour. If the failure 
rate of the SI pump is 1.37E-3/hr, then the conditional probability table associated with 
the node Low P SI is shown in Table 7.2. Note that if the pump were ON in the current 
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time step, we assume that it will remain ON in the next time step. If this were not the case, 
then the last row in Table 7.2 will need to be adjusted accordingly. 
 
Table 7.2. Conditional probability table for the SI pump, assuming a failure probability of          
      1.37E-3 during 1 hour of operation. 
 
 Time T 
Time T-Δ OFF ON 
OFF 1 0 
ON 1.37E-3 0.99863 
 
The root nodes representing the failure time of the auxiliary feedwater system 
(AFW Fail time), the trip time of the primary coolant pump (RCP Trip Time), the time 
delay between the loss of feedwater and the reactor scram (Scram Delay), and the F&B 
initiation delay (Feed Delay and Bleed Delay) are all constant across different time slices. 
This is intuitive since these variables do not change across time slice. Note that these 
constant nodes appear under the black line in Figure 7.1 to indicate that they are not 
specifically part of any one slice but are shared among all slices. 
In the model, we decided to allow the nodes No. PORV Opened, Low P SI pump 
and No. Hi P SI pump to vary with each time slice. Physically, this means that the number 
of pumps and PORVs that are operational may change with time slice. The change in the 
state of these nodes between different time slices may be caused by stochastic failures, or 
by deterministic automatic and manual controls. For instance, if we are interested in 
including human behavior modeling into the network, we may treat the manual control as 
stochastic to account for variation in operator response time. Human behavior is not 
considered in this example. To complete the Bayesian network model, we need to specify 
the root node probability or probability distribution. Table 7.3 shows the values that we 
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use in the model. The choice of the root node and their probabilities are based on [She11], 
although some numbers are adjusted for our model. We will next describe the 
significance of some of these variables.  
In normal circumstance, the reactor is automatically set to scram when the water 
level in the steam generator falls to about 30% of the narrow range indicator. In the Zion-
1 plant, this occurs approximately 30 s after the loss of main feedwater if there is no 
auxiliary feedwater flow. There are situations where the operator may be aware of the 
feedwater loss before the steam generator water level drops to the automatic trip setting 
and in these cases, the reactor may be manually tripped before automatic scram occurs. It 
is also possible that the loss of main feedwater is not abrupt, leading to a longer delay 
between the start of the loss-of-feedwater event and the steam generator low level signal. 
To account for these possible scenarios, we model the reactor scram delay time as a 
uniform distribution between 0 and 90 s.  
Table 7.3. Adjustable parameters in the Bayesian network model. 
Description  Probability Distribution 
Reactor scram delay  Uniform between 0 and 90 s 
F&B initiation delay Lognormal with mean = 4 mins and sigma = 2 mins 
Number of SI pump available Failure prob=0.012/demand per pump, Failure rate=1.37E-3/hr 
Number of charging pump 
available 
Failure prob=0.0078/demand per pump, 
Failure rate=1.37E-3/hr 
Number of PORV opened Failure to open prob=0.014 per valve 
Delay between feed initiation and 
bleed initiation Normal with mean=20s and sigma=10s 
Time of RCP trip Not tripped 
AFW failure time Failure prob on demand=0.9. Probability of successful actuation but fails <30 mins=0.1 
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Another variable that will affect the core temperature is the delay between the loss 
of feedwater and the initiation of the F&B procedure. As can be seen in Figure 5.3, 
following the loss of main feedwater, the plant operator has to go through a series of 
procedural steps before F&B operations are initiated. These steps, including verification 
of the loss of feedwater and implementing the various methods to manually activate the 
AFW system, will cause some delay in the initiation of the primary feed. Since the exact 
timing that the operator will enter the F&B emergency operating procedure will depend 
on the plant state and indicators in the control room, there is a large distribution in the 
time delay before the feed is initiated. Following the recommendation from [She11], we 
will model the time to initiate F&B distribution as a log-normal distribution, with a mean 
of 4 mins.  
After the F&B operation is implemented, the bleed rate is another important 
parameter that will affect the time evolution of the primary coolant temperature. If the 
bleed rate is too low, the primary coolant pressure will increase, leading to a decrease in 
the injection capacity and heat removal from the fuel. Conversely, a bleed rate that is 
higher than the injection rate will lead to a loss of coolant scenario. In our analysis, the 
coolant bleed rate from the primary system is determined mainly by the number of 
PORVs that are opened. We assume that the probability that any one of the PORVs will 
fail to open is 0.014. Note that in addition to the PORVs, the pressurizer also has safety 
valves that will automatically open on high pressurizer pressure. These safety valves are 
not normally used in the F&B operation, although there can be situations when the relief 
capacity of the PORVs is too low to relieve the primary system pressure. In these 
situations, the safety valves will open and provide additional relief paths. 
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Generally, for analysis of the feed-and-bleed scenario, we are interested in 
situations where the AFW system does not actuate. In an operating power plant, after the 
loss of main feedwater, the operator will try to manually start the AFW system if it does 
not come on automatically. The entry into the emergency operating procedure which 
prescribes the F&B operation will not occur unless attempts to start the AFW fail. 
Nevertheless, data from the NUREG/CR-6928 [NRC07] indicate that even in situations 
where the AFW system successfully operates, the F&B operation may still be necessary 
if the auxiliary pumps fail before the core cools down sufficiently. In an attempt to 
account for this scenario, we will assume that there is a 10% chance that the AFW system 
will successfully actuate on demand, but will fail within 30 minutes of the actuation.  
One last parameter that we should mention is the reactor coolant pump (RCP) trip 
delay. Generally, the coolant pump is not tripped until the core power is below a certain 
fraction of the rated power (usually 1%). The trip is initiated to reduce a source of heat 
addition to the primary coolant water. However, in scenarios such as a station blackout, 
the coolant pump trip will coincide with the loss of feedwater. In most published studies 
of the feed-and-bleed scenario, the coolant pump is tripped at the beginning of the 
transient to ensure that the results are conservative. However, in our analysis, we will not 
trip the pump in most of the cases presented in Section 7.2. This decision means that the 
feed-and-bleed procedure in our model will cool the core more effectively than would be 
suggested in other studies.   
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7.2 RELAP5 Results for Representative Cases 
In this section, we will present the behavior of the reactor after the loss of main feedwater 
as obtained from RELAP5 calculations. The results obtained here will be used to 
construct the code surrogates from which we can construct the deterministic conditional 
“probability” function needed to solve the Bayesian network. The surrogates will also 
allow us to perform a Monte Carlo sampling and obtain the probability distribution of the 
non-root nodes much more efficiently than through repetitive RELAP5 runs. 
In our RELAP5 model, the location of the maximum clad temperature occurs at 
node 5 of volume 335 (see Figure 6.1). The initial sequence of events for all the cases in 
this section is based on the reference sequence shown in Table 7.4. Any deviations from 
this baseline case will be noted in the description of the individual cases. Following the 
loss-of-main feedwater at 0 s and the associated failure of the AFW system to engage, the 
reactor will automatically scram when narrow range water level in the steam generator 
reaches 25%. For the reference case, the scram time is assumed to be 30s. 
 
Table 7.4. Sequence of event following the loss of main feedwater for the reference case. 
The RCP is not tripped in this scenario. 
 
Event Time [s] 
Loss of Main Feedwater 0 s 
Failure of Auxiliary Feedwater System 0 s 
Reactor Trip 30 s 
Turbine Valve Closed 30 s 
A plot of the fuel cladding temperature as a function of transient time is shown in 
Figure 7.3 for the baseline case where F&B is not initiated.  For all scram delay times up 
to 90 s, the clad temperature remains relatively constant until the secondary water 
inventory in the steam generator is depleted. The time of depletion varies with the scram 
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delay. With a 0 s delay (scram is coincident with the loss of feedwater), the steam 
generator dryout occurs approximately 90 minutes into the transient. With a 90 s delay, 
the dryout occurs much earlier at around 30 minutes. After the dryout occurs, the clad 
temperature rises rapidly for all delay times. The rate of temperature increase after the 
steam generator dryout is relatively independent of the scram delay. As expected, the 
case of a 90 s scram delay leads to the highest clad temperature of 1800 oF after 4 hours.  
 
Figure 7.3. Peak clad temperature as a function of transient time for the scram delay time 
of 0 s, 30 s, 60 s, and 90 s. F&B is not initiated. 
 
Figures 7.4 and 7.5 show the variation of the average coolant temperature and 
pressure as a function of transient time. From the plot, the primary pressure remains 
essentially constant until the F&B operation is initiated at around 7200s. The opening of 
the PORVs associated with this operation causes the pressure to drop by over 50%. The 
coolant temperature rises steadily after the LOFW until the time of the F&B operation. At 
7200 s, the temperature drops sharply as an extra heat removal pathway is established. 
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The dependence of the clad temperature on the scram delay is weaker in the case 
where the F&B operation is initiated early in the transient. Figure 7.6 shows the case 
where the F&B operation is initiated 10 minutes after the loss of feedwater. The clad 
temperature drops initially following the scram, then briefly rises over the next 600 s 
before the F&B operation is initiated. Once the feed flow starts, the temperature begins to 
fall at a rate that is almost independent of the scram delay time. A steam generator dryout 
does not occur in this scenario since the F&B operation provides the main path of decay 
heat removal. 
In Figure 7.7, we see the effect of the time delay for the initiation of F&B on the 
clad temperature. With a delay of 10 minutes, the clad temperature does not rise much 
from the initial value, and it falls at a constant rate once the primary feed starts. As 
expected, the peak for the clad temperature during the transient is highest in the case 
where the F&B operation is delayed the longest.  
The effect of the number of PORVs that are successfully opened for the bleed 
operation is shown in Figure 7.8. The rate of cooling provided by the F&B operation is 
lower for the case where one of the PORVs failed to open. The lower bleed flow rate 
results in a higher primary pressure which in turn results in lower feed rate (since the feed 
rate is pressure dependent).  The effect of primary system pressure on the total feed rate 
is shown in Figure 7.9. At pressures near the steady state operating pressure of 2252 psia, 
only the charging pump has enough power to inject water into the core. Fig 7.10 shows 
the effect of feed flow rate on the clad temperature. As expected, cooling is achieved at a 
faster rate in situations where the feed rate is high. 
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Most studies on the viability of the F&B operation use a conservative assumption that the 
AFW system fails to initiate immediately following the loss of feedwater. However, if the 
auxiliary system does actuate but fails early into the transient, the impact on fuel 
temperature will be similar to the cases described in the preceding paragraphs. Figure 
7.11 looks at how a delayed AFW system failure will affect the scenario. The plot 
suggests that an AFW system failure delay merely prolongs the initial period where the 
clad temperature remains relatively constant. After the failure, the behavior is similar to 
all the previous cases. Thus, the AFW delay merely shifts the clad temperature profile to 
a later point in the transient. 
In this section, we looked at how some of the parameters listed in Table 7.3 
impact the time evolution of the peak clad temperature. The results shown in this section 
all assume that only one parameter changes while all the other parameters remain 
constant. However, if we need to either perform any type of sampling for a Monte Carlo 
simulation or to construct a conditional probability function for the Bayesian network, we 
need to be able to predict how the clad temperature responds, given any random values of 
the independent variables. To achieve this goal, we will need to use the conditional 
independence assumptions that were made when constructing the Bayesian network 
model in Figure 7.1. The next step in building the conditional probability function will be 
to develop surrogates for all the RELAP5 cases so that we can avoid the need to run the 
RELAP5 case for every parametric case. These surrogates will be discussed in the next 
section. 
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Figure 7.4. Primary coolant pressure as a function of time for 30 s scram delay and 2 
hours F&B initiation delay. 
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Figure 7.5. Primary coolant temperature as a function of time for 30 s scram delay and 2 
hours F&B initiation delay. 
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 Figure 7.6. Peak clad temperature as a function of transient time for the scram delay time 
of 0 s, 30 s, and 60 s. F&B is initiated 10 mins after the LOFW. 
 
 
Figure 7.7. Peak clad temperature as a function of transient time for the F&B initiation 
delay of 10 mins, 2 hrs, and 3 hrs after the loss of feedwater. The scram delay time is 60 s 
for all three cases. 
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Figure 7.8. Peak clad temperature as a function of transient time for cases where 1 and 2 
PORVs successfully opened. The scram delay time is 60 s and the F&B operation is 
initiated 2 hours after the loss of feedwater. 
 
 
Figure 7.9. Feed flow rate (from both high and low pressure injection systems) as a 
function of primary pressure. 
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 Figure 7.10. Peak clad temperature as a function of transient time for cases where 33%, 
50%, and 100% of the makeup flow (from both the high and low pressure injection 
systems) are available. The scram delay time is 60 s and the F&B operation is initiated 2 
hours after the loss of feedwater. 
 
 
Figure 7.11. Peak clad temperature as a function of time for the case where the AFW fails 
immediately and 20 mins after the loss of feedwater. The scram delay time is 60s and the 
F&B operation is initiated 2 hours after the loss of feedwater. 
 
85 
 
7.3 Constructing the RELAP5 Surrogates using ACE 
Referring to Figure 7.1, we wish to find the relationship between the clad temperature 
(dependent variable), and the primary coolant pressure, primary coolant temperature, and 
the coolant flow rate (three independent variables). We compile the RELAP5 cases that 
were run varying these three independent variables (about 20 cases) and tabulate the 
functional behavior of the clad temperature on changes in the primary coolant pressure, 
temperature, and flow rate. This procedure generates about 5000 data points which give 
the relationship between the four variables. The matrix containing these data is then used 
in the ACE algorithm to generate the transformed variables. Figure 7.14 shows the result 
of the transformation. The  R2 = 0.997 value for the fit suggests that the linear additive 
relationship 
 1 1 2 2 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Y X X Xθ φ φ φ= + +  (7.1) 
is valid.  
Earlier in this chapter, we mentioned how some parent node may contribute less 
to the behavior of a child node compared to other parents. From Figure 7.14, we see that 
the variable X2 (Primary Water Pressure) contributes less than 1% of X1, and 10% of X3 
to the transformed dependent variable ( )Yθ .  This means that the coolant temperature 
and hence the clad temperature is relatively independent of the primary coolant pressure, 
at least within the scope of our model. However, for the sake of completeness, we will 
keep Primary Coolant Pressure as a parent of Primary Coolant Temperature.
Next, we need to determine the functional behavior of the primary coolant 
temperature on its dependent variables as specified in Figure 7.1. Using the same step 
that we used to develop Figure 7.14, we obtain the transformations shown in Figures 7.15 
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and 7.16. The R2 value associated with the surrogate is 0.979. Note that unlike the case of 
the clad temperature model in Figure 7.10, the primary coolant pressure is the dominant 
parent in determining the state of the coolant temperature.  The relationship between the 
transformed water temperature and the untransformed temperature is shown in Figure 
7.16. Note that we do not need a RELAP5 surrogate for the Injection Flow Rate node. 
The dependence of the feed flow on the number of pumps operating and the primary 
system pressure can be taken directly from Table 7.1. 
Figures 7.12 and 7.13 show scattered plots of the clad temperature and coolant 
temperature versus their respective independent variables. The data from these plots were 
obtained by combining the 50 RELAP5 cases that were used to generate the surrogates. 
From these plots, we expect to see a mostly linear relationship between clad temperature 
and coolant temperature, but the relationship of the other variables are less clear. Note 
that the multi-valued nature of these plots suggest that each of the independent variables 
are not sufficient to determine the dependent variable by itself. The surrogates obtained 
from Figures 7.12 and 7.13 are shown in Figure 7.14 and 7.15. As expected, we see that 
the relationship between the clad and coolant temperatures are mostly linear. The 
relationship for the other variables are more well defined in the transformed function 
space compared to the original data. 
Figures 7.17 through 7.19 show the benchmarking of the surrogates for the 
coolant pressure, clad temperature, and coolant temperature against the values obtained 
from RELAP5. 
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Figure 7.12. Scatter plots of clad temperature as a function of its independent variables. 
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Figure 7.13. Scatter plots of coolant temperature as a function of its independent 
variables.
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Figure 7.14. Clad temperature as a function of three transformed variables obtained via 
the ACE algorithm. are the coolant temperature, pressure, and flow rate, 
respectively. The dependent variable is Y, the clad temperature. 
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Figure 7.15. Transformed dependent variables as a function of the original variable for 
the Primary Coolant Temperature node. 
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Figure 7.16. Transformed primary coolant temperature as a function of the original 
variable. 
 
  We note that although we used a quasi-static state assumption in the DBN structure of 
Figure 7.1 to generate these surrogates, we are able to reproduce the time-dependent 
behavior of the plant variables.  Generally, we may not expect that a quasi-state state 
assumption will allow the surrogates to track the process variables well during periods of 
large changes (for instance, the large drop in pressure after opening of the PORVs). 
However, Figures 7.17 - 7.19 show that even when there are large variations in the 
variables, the surrogate still perform adequately. The values of the independent variables 
that are used in the benchmarking in the above figures cover the entire range covered in 
the sampling. For instance, the scram delay varies from 30 s to 90 s and the F&B 
initiation delay ranges from 10 mins to infinity (no F&B operation). Therefore, we are 
relatively confident that the surrogates provide a good approximation for RELAP5, at 
least in the interval of interest. 
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Figure 7.17. Benchmarking of the coolant pressure surrogate. From left to right, the cases 
are: 33% feed rate (60 s scram delay and 2 hrs F&B delay), 50% bleed rate (60 s scram 
delay and 2 hrs F&B delay), 100% feed and bleed rates (60 s scram delay and 2 hrs F&B 
delay), 10 mins F&B delay (60 s scram delay), 10 mins F&B delay (30 s scram delay), 
and 90 s scram delay without F&B. 
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Figure 7.18. Benchmarking of the clad temperature surrogate. From left to right, the cases 
are: 33% feed rate (60 s scram delay and 2 hrs F&B delay), 50% bleed rate (60 s scram 
delay and 2 hrs F&B delay), 100% feed and bleed rates (60 s scram delay and 2 hrs F&B 
delay), 10 mins F&B delay (60 s scram delay), 10 mins F&B delay (30 s scram delay), 
and 90 s scram delay without F&B. 
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Figure 7.19. Benchmarking of the coolant temperature surrogate. From left to right, the 
cases are: 33% feed rate (60 s scram delay and 2 hrs F&B delay), 50% bleed rate (60 s 
scram delay and 2 hrs F&B delay), 100% feed and bleed rates (60 s scram delay and 2 hrs 
F&B delay), 10 mins F&B delay (60 s scram delay), 10 mins F&B delay (30 s scram 
delay), and 90 s scram delay without F&B. 
 
7.4 Risk Analysis Result for the Loss of Feedwater Transient 
With the data presented in the previous two sections, we now have sufficient information 
to calculate the core damage probability given the root event probability distribution in 
Table 7.3. This distribution is generated by weighting the distribution of the fuel clad 
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temperature that we obtained with the Monte Carlo sampling of the ACE surrogates for 
the probability of core damage. The plot, shown in Figure 7.20, represents the probability 
of having core damage at each time step. At 15000 s into the transient, the core damage 
probability peaks at 5E-3. From Figure 7.7, we can see that the peak clad temperature can 
occur anywhere from 10 mins, in the case of early F&B initiation, to over 3 hours if the 
F&B operation is delayed. In all of these cases, the clad damage probability will either 
increase or remain constant after the peak temperature is reached.  
 Looking at the root node probabilities, we expect that the dominant contributions 
to clad failures will come from cases where both the scram delay and the F&B initiation 
delay are large. Since we use a uniform distribution for the scram delay time, the Monte 
Carlo history which has a large delay time occurs relatively frequently. The F&B 
actuation delay largely determines when the peak clad temperature will occur. After the 
F&B operation is initiated, the clad temperature falls rapidly, leading to a near constant 
fuel damage probability. 
The Bayesian network is solved using 80,000 Monte Carlo samples from the distributions 
given in Table 7.3 . Figure 7.20 shows the time-dependent failure probability for the 
LOFW transient. The plot indicates that about 3.5 hours into the transient, we can expect 
approximately a 0.5% probability of core damage. Unlike the event tree method, it is 
difficult to determine the cut set or the relative contributions of different sequences to the 
final core damage probability via the Bayesian network method. Nevertheless, we can 
make an educated guess on the qualitative behavior of the plot. The rise in the damage 
probability after 3.5 hours is likely a result of a combination of high scram delay time, 
low injection rate, and the long F&B initiation delay.  
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Figure 7.20. Core damage probability as a function of transient time. The Max plot is the 
result of the one case with no F&B initiation and 90 s scram delay. 
 
  In Fig. 7.20, we have also included the core damage probability associated with 
the case of no F&B operation and with a 90 s scram delay. This case gives the highest 
clad temperature at any point in time among at the cases that are included in the 
simulation. Therefore, this case serves as the upper bound for our core damage 
probability. 
 In our analysis, we have shifted the threshold of core damage downward by 
approximately 200 oF. This was done to allow more of our Monte Carlo samples to have 
a nonzero probability of core damage so that we obtain adequate number of cases that 
produce core damage. One way to avoid this modification will be to increase our end 
time for the analysis of 15000 s. This will allow the clad temperature in more Monte 
Carlo cases to produce core damage. The narrowing of the density function in Figure 7.2 
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will result in a shift of the time for the onset of core damage to the right. In Figure 7.20, 
this will translate to a faster rise in core damage probability after about 3.5 hours. We 
also expect the damage probability to increase beyond 15000 s and it will be interesting 
to investigate when the peak probability occurs. 
  
CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Probabilistic risk analysis methods can generally be divided into two groups: the classical 
static techniques and the newer dynamic techniques. Static PRA makes certain 
simplifications regarding the time evolution of the process variables in the reactors and 
analyzes the effects of different initiation events by using these assumptions. Reactor 
analysis codes can be employed during the construction of the model to determine the 
behavior of the reactor under the assumed reactor configuration and how the 
configuration changes during the accident. Static PRA techniques work well when the 
accident evolution falls under the range of validity for the simplifying assumptions. 
However, in situations where the changes in plant state have a large impact on the 
accident progression, the static methodologies may yield erroneous results. These 
situations include cases where the operator action may be a strong function of the process 
history or in cases of standby systems where the exact plant configuration at the time of 
demand may be variable. In these instances, a dynamic PRA approach is the preferred 
method. 
 A brief overview of some commonly known dynamic PRA techniques are 
discussed in Chapter 2. Most of these techniques have a common drawback that they are 
quite complicated for applications in large systems. In the dynamic PRA approach, the 
process variable evolution is incorporated directly into the models, leading to a direct 
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coupling of risk analysis with plant state changes. However, with the a large number of 
path that the plant state may follow and the complex response behavior of the accident 
progression, the calculations involved in applying these techniques are very CPU and 
memory intensive. Therefore, in most practical applications, these techniques are only 
used to analyze subsystems of the entire plant where the use of static PRA is inadequate. 
 With the two extremes of the PRA methodologies mentioned above, there are 
recognitions that in some situations, the analysts may not need the full power of dynamic 
PRA methodologies and yet want to incorporate the plant response directly into the 
analysis. The work presented in this dissertation aims to bridge this gap between static 
and dynamic techniques. In this dissertation, we present a method where the core damage 
probability is calculated as a function of time by using a DBN model in conjunction with 
the RELAP5 code surrogates constructed via the ACE algorithm. The use of the DBN 
allows the dependencies among the plant components to be broken into smaller models 
which are easier to analyze than the full model. For each of these small subsets in the 
DBN, the number of independent variables that need to be considered is greatly reduced. 
The use of the ACE algorithm now becomes more efficient since only selected variables 
need to be considered. 
 A major drawback of our proposed method is its sensitivity to the conditional 
independence assumption. If we do not consider the correct parent in the network or if we 
miss important independent variables during the construction of the surrogate, then the 
results we obtain will give inaccurate results. Furthermore, the use of the surrogate is 
restricted to analyses that are performed within its range of validity. If a transient takes 
the reactor along a path that causes the parameters to fall outside the scope of our 
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surrogate, then the prediction of the network will no longer be accurate. In these cases, 
our model will not give any indications that something is wrong, and it will be up to the 
analyst to ensure that all the parameters used in the DBN are within the range of validity. 
 In this work, we have applied the DBN model to the calculation of the time-
dependent core damage probability associated with a LOFW accident. The conditional 
independence statements of important plant components are used to construct the DBN 
model which links the clad temperature to independent variables such as the scram delay 
time and the F&B initiation time. The conditional probability functions associated with 
the nodes in the DBN are a combination of the deterministic ACE surrogates of the 
RELAP5 code and probability densities describing the failure rates of various plant 
components. The use of the ACE surrogates inside the DBN allows the network to be 
solved much faster than possible  if a direct coupling with RELAP5 were made.  The 
results of our calculation show that the core damage probability begins to increase from 0 
at about 3 hours into the LOFW transient, corresponding to the time when the peak clad 
temperature in most Monte Carlo samples exceeds 1600oF. We note that if we allow the 
RELAP5 runs to exceed 15000 s, then mostly likely the core damage probability will 
continue to increase. 
The work in this dissertation focuses on using the RELAP5 surrogate and the 
factorization property of the DBN to allow an integration of the system dynamics with a 
PRA analysis in a simplified manner. The quasi-state ACE surrogates are able to 
represent dynamic behavior of the system accurately. Further study in this area will 
involve extending the analysis to beyond 15000 s and looking at how the core damage 
probability increases beyond this period. Due to a time limitation, we have restricted our 
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analysis up to 15000 s after the LOFW and we have shifted the temperature at which core 
damage starts by 200 oF. Should the transient be allowed to continue past 15000 s, we 
expect that this modification will no longer be necessary as the clad temperature will 
exceed the threshold for clad damage in many more Monte Carlo samples. 
An aspect of DBN that is not covered in this research is its potential use in 
diagnostics and real-time monitoring. With the ability of DBN to update both the 
conditional independence functions and the root node probabilities with real data, a DBN 
risk model will be useful for monitoring the risk of the reactor in real time. In this type of 
application, we can envision the linking of all the control room instrumentation readings 
into the network and continuously update the risk of the reactor in real time. During an 
accident or unanticipated transients, the operators will have access to real time 
information on the risk as emergency procedures are implemented. The use of our 
DBN/ACE model in this way could be one possible area of future research. 
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